Ebook: Perseverance of Terrorism: Focus on Leaders

The paper discusses some ontological and methodological issues involved in the studying of terrorist leaders. It starts from assessing the state of literature on terrorism in general and recurring challenges identified in it. In the many self-reflecting articles on the topic, the following issues are identified: the problem of the absence of an agreed definition; the poor quality of research; itinerant contributors; presence of ‘self-appointed experts’; unwillingness of researchers to commit to the study of terrorism; lack of barriers of entry into the field; problems with data; lack of cohesion and lack of clear methodologies; lack of intellectual progress. The paper moves on to discuss issues particular to the analysis of terrorist leaders. The trends identified follow the dichotomies present in social sciences in general, such as structure vs. agency and explanation vs. understanding. The paper shows fruitful avenues available in advancing on these roads. The last section discusses the value of different methodologies such as qualitative and quantitative analysis identifying the work done so far and assessing the possibilities for the future.

Poland should provide for comprehensive participation in the fight against terrorism also by contributing to the creation and implementation of international law, and at the same time adequately shaping its domestic legal framework. The article will focus on both international as well as Polish criminal law and their definitions of a terrorist act. Criminal law is the most basic tool to pursue and condemn individuals involved in terrorism. The author will briefly examine and compare Polish and international legal solutions as well as draw policy implications for Poland.

The following brief overview offers consideration of why quantitative research on terrorist leader targeting may be a dead-end or at least of questionable use from a policy-maker's perspective. It presents the quest for identifying best policies against terrorism as largely futile given the multi-dimensional and reflexive nature of the strategic interaction of terrorists and counter-terrorists. Developing a doctrine for counterterrorism is not impossible, however. The criticism offered here merely posits that such a doctrine can never be used without case-specific considerations, with special regards to the large number of strategically relevant variables over which decision-makers have weak control or perhaps none at all.

The main argument of the text is problem of the new threats Europe is currently facing. Can we really say that terrorism is its major security problem? According to EUROPOL, terrorism is in decline in Europe. Author is showing us how the world of modern security threats is changing. He is setting new agenda, asking where all “old” criminals are going to go, when the common threats are gone. Several new criminal markets are being named: dangerous counterfeit, migration from the real world to the cyber world, corruption and looting of the major sports, through fixing bets. He is emphasizing criminal-hybrids and their increasing role in the future. At the end, author is giving interesting criminal forecast for years to come.

This chapter will make some suggestions to take the research on terrorist leadership elimination forward. Although recent studies into the effectiveness of leadership elimination are impressive in their scope, they suffer from three main flaws. First, too little attention is paid to the various kinds authority wielded by terrorist leaders. Different types of terrorist leadership should be identified to see whether leadership elimination works better against certain types of leadership. Second, the research into leadership elimination is focused too narrowly on terrorist organisations that have a clearly identifiable leader. Broadening the scope to include the elimination of cell and ring leaders will allow for the application of the concept of leadership elimination to loosely structured terrorist networks. Third, the impact of terrorist leadership elimination is defined too narrowly in terms of attack numbers or organisational survival. Instead, different kinds of effects should be formulated for different kinds of leaders. To address these three flaws, analysts and researchers need to go over the cases they know well in order to identify types of terrorist leadership, types of leadership elimination, and possible impacts of terrorist leadership elimination. The testing of the resulting hypotheses will enhance our understanding of the impact of terrorist leadership elimination.

In the broader context of homegrown jihadist terrorism in the West, most interpretations of the 2013 Boston Marathon attack generally conform to the concept of “jihad of individual terrorism”. This concept effectively blurs the boundary between a network agent and a stand-alone “lone wolf”. The choice between the two often boils down to whether or not one accepts that acting in the name of a universalist extremist ideology suffices for otherwise dispersed and unconnected self-generating cells to qualify as parts of a larger network. While conforming to some general patterns of homegrown jihadist attacks in the United States, the Boston Marathon attack stands out for two less typical, and mutually contradictory, characteristics. For a pure “lone wolve” jihadist act, the Boston bombings were a rarely successful mass-casualty attack. This either makes it a major outlier, or suggests some external connections, training or support. However, the bombers' purported links to the North Caucasus militant underground as the suspected foreign source of such support are most atypical for U.S.-based jihadist terrorists, even if such links have some precedence among jihadist cells in Europe.

The major argument of this essay is that the impact of specific, high-ranking militants within AQIM was decisive in boosting the Sahelisation and the hybridisation of the Algerian terrorism. The GSPC had to move southward following the situation of weakness in which it was caught at the end of the 1990s. Yet, the rise within the ranks of the GSPC/AQIM of Mokhtar Belmokhtar earlier, and Abou Zeid later, were key factors in changing the operational and geographic features of the group. Above all after joining the Al Qaeda franchising – and using more Qaedist tactics to hit Algeria between 2007 and 2008 – the group increased its focus on para-legal and illegal economic activities, some of them also openly illicit (Haram), reducing its commitment toward proper and classic minor Jihad. The personalities, as well as the personal features and ambitions of the two key AQIM southern leaders, were key in strengthening this dynamic.

Article presents some empirical data on targeted killing/ assassination of the leaders and members of terrorists' and guerilla groups in the Afpak region 2004 - 2012 with the use of American Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones). I focus my attention on core al Qaeda and its affiliates as well as Taliban leadership assassinated through this program. I disregard in my paper the problems of both legal and moral judgment of targeted killings, concentrating attention on its growing efficiency and scope. It seems that attacks are based on precise and actionable intelligence resulting in its growing number and effectiveness. One can also presume that no more than 10% of the victims of these American attacks can be described as collateral damage. As a result planning and operational capabilities of terrorist groups, primarily al Qaeda central have been effectively limited. However, this statement is not precise as far as so called Taliban groups are concerned.

The paper intents to elaborate a part of the important issues relating to the establishment and operation of illegal structures that use violence as a main method for realizing political goals, and are called terrorist groups and organizations. Namely, it is a clarification of the role of leaders of terrorist groups and organizations through interpenetration in their psychological profile, which is the basis for trying to get to the typology of the leaders of these illegal structures. It starts by explaining the objective importance of social conflicts, from whose opposition the formation and activities of terrorist groups and organizations is derived, that leads to individuals to clearly and directly project their goals and interests and determine the specific methods available in order to achieve the most immediate change. In terms of the psychological profile of leaders of terrorist groups and organizations, these aspects are taken into consideration: motives; motivating processes; opinions that affect planning and organization and implementation of specific violent acts that lead to the realization of the given political purposes. The typology of leaders is established according to five criteria - political-ideological matrix, consistency, readiness for physical sacrifice, the radius of action and linkage to external factors. In the second part of the paper three cases of leaders of illegal structures in Macedonia are presented, with drawing conclusions based on theoretical settings psychological profile and typology of leaders of terrorist groups and organizations.

This text includes three case studies of leadership related to right-wing extremist violence on Czech territory in various historical eras. The first analyses the terrorist campaign of Vlajka (The Flag) at the end of the 1930s, the second racist skinhead murderers from Písek in 1993 and the third the structures which organized racist anti-Roma riots in Northern Bohemia in 2008. The specifics of actions carried out by a compact organisation with a formal leader and actions organized by informal subcultural local milieu with a local leader are explained, as well as multilevel” drivers of ethnic riots.

This chapter concentrates on debates among and between Jordanian Salafi networks of quietist (a-political) and jihadi (violently radical) Salafis. These debates focus especially on the discrediting of Salafis' opponents through theological labels and accusations and how these actually mask the real and much more personal sources of tension between them. As such, this chapter seeks to give greater insight into religious authority among Salafi networks in Jordan and intends to show that the disputes between Jordanian Salafis dealt with here originate less in theological and doctrinal differences than in conflicts over religious leadership and authority.

The paper aims to explain specificities of Islam in the post Yugoslav political space which we today describe as the Western Balkans. It focuses on two aspects of Islam in the region: Islam understood as political ideology and Islam through its Islamist face providing some basic concepts related to both phenomenons. To what extent these aspects of Islam have been “imported” and do they truly impose a real threat to political stability in the region? Can we consider any threat in terms of terrorist acts in the region? These are some questions and doubts to which the paper using the descriptive method of analysis tries to give answers.

The basic scientific problem of paper is explained through historical review of the development of the intelligence services in the independent Republic of Macedonia, structures and directions of reform in this area according to the new phenomena of so-called asymmetric threats. Exploring the current state of the security sector in the country, the paper details the processes specific segments that are engaged in this activity and the need for systemic regulation of this area. In this regard in detail is exposed anti-terror legislation and specialized institutions in charge of combating terrorism. The idea is to inform the international academic and professional public on historical and current aspects of intelligence in the country especially in the fight against terrorism.