Ebook: Non-Proliferation, Safety and Nuclear Security

This book is the outcome of the challenge created by the publishing of essays on the shift from safeguards to nuclear security, from a technical and political standpoint. The global sense of the challenge is what nuclear security summits have undertaken. The international political process is moving on in view of the conclusive summit that will take place in Washington next spring; although promising, from the viewpoint of training and education, the process is still taking its first steps. The problem posed by the risk of nuclear terrorism is still too recent compared to the historical problem of nuclear proliferation. The academy and the institutions involved in nuclear security need time to create educational and training programs on a global scale. The advanced training course financed by the NATO program Science for Peace and Security held in Rabat in December 2014 by the editors of this book was a small step taken in this direction.

The speeches given by the lecturers of the course have been collected in these pages to further encourage the development of a project that is even at an earlier stage compared to E&T; they are relevant to the scientific research on nuclear security, considered as an autonomous subject. As we write, the first issue of the only journal dedicated to nuclear security is in the works: the range of books and scientific articles on the subject is still very narrow, especially when compared to the much wider one dedicated to non-proliferation. Therefore, this collection of essays describes the two-fold project carried out by nuclear science and technology on the one hand, and politics and international history on the other.

The scholars who have contributed to making this book are among the most representative in this challenge, and they work from different perspectives to achieve a sustainable regime of nuclear security. We wish to thank them profusely for having contributed to the creation of this book. Many thanks to Valerio Cartocci, for his editorial work.

Matteo Gerlini and Abdelwahed Chetaine

November 2015

This article describes sources of ionizing radiation and gives some reasons for the variations in radiation exposure received. It also presents the multiple uses of radiation sources in different socio-economic sectors and the basic principles of radiation protection.

Throughout the history of life on earth, organisms continuously have been exposed to cosmic rays, radionuclides produced by cosmic ray interactions in the atmosphere, and radiation from naturally occurring substances (terrestrial) which are ubiquitously distributed in all living and nonliving components of the environment. The largest natural source of radiation exposure to humans is radon gas. While radon gas has always been in the environment, awareness of its contribution to human radiation exposure has increased in recent years. It is clear that contemporary life have adjusted or are doing so to all features and limitations of the environment, including the natural radiation background. Although high levels of radiation are definitely harmful to organisms, some environmental radiation is of importance to life.

Over the last few decades man has “artificially” produced several hundred radionuclides. And he has learned to use the power of the atom for a wide variety of purposes, from medicine to weapons, from the production of energy to the detection of fires, from illuminating watches to prospecting for minerals. With regard to sources of artificial exposure, is the use of radiation in medicine which dominates other uses of radiation.

After being pushed into the background of the academic discussion on the evolution of the post-bipolar international politics, the debate over the role of nuclear weapons and the effects of their proliferation has partially revived in the recent months, following the signing of the agreement with Iran and the armed confrontation in the eastern regions of Ukraine. This article reviews the most prominent scholarly contributions on classical nuclear deterrence theory and sheds light on the new challenges of nuclear proliferation in contemporary international politics. In the post-global international system the old central axis of the system has been substituted by less stable relations both at global and regional levels. Today state and non-state actors involved in nuclear relations belong to different ‘civilizations’, and the traditional deterrence exercised by states toward non-state actors may be totally ineffective, given that de-territorialised and transnational terrorist organizations are impermeable to conventional nuclear threats. In this complex environment, the nuclear non-proliferation regime created during the Cold War looks manifestly inadequate to face the new challenges, and its main pillar, the NPT, is subject to many pressures that could lead to its collapse.

This article describes the recent legal frameworks adopted both in the United States and in Europe toward the concept of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. The article focuses on the activity of the IAEA, which promoted several initiatives regarding nuclear security and safety. It explores the safety and security interface during an emergency, taking into consideration the practice of Joint safety-security exercises and the implications of the Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011. In conclusion, the article explores how the nexus between nuclear security and nuclear safety emerged in the Nuclear Security Summit.

This article analyzes the European Union policies in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, including nuclear security. The European Union is a hybrid between a federation of States and supra-national entity. Its very nature might actually result in a set of actions – some ambitious and unlikely to generate immediate results, some fruit of a necessary common minimum denominator approach, thus not entirely adequate to the pressing needs – that in the long term would fit the changing nature of the challenges at stake in such a field.

The international community's involvement in, and awareness of, nuclear security has grown significantly in the past fifteen years. In the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001, governments acknowledged the need to increase nuclear security. Although the September 2001 attacks were not nuclear or radiological in nature, there was a fear that future attacks might be, especially if non-state actors were able to access nuclear material. Growing numbers of both potential threats and nuclear facilities around the world led the international community to seek greater security measures and ensure that states are equipped to implement those measures. Since the beginning of the nuclear age, the term ‘nuclear security’ has evolved significantly in both how it is defined and how states respond to it. At present, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines nuclear security as, ‘the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorised access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities [1].

The human dimension, encompassing the security culture and human resources development, is the foundation of a sustainable security regime. On the one hand, the origin of any event with radiological consequences can ultimately be tracked down to the human factor; on the other hand, nuclear security culture and adequate human resources at all levels (including regulators, law enforcement agencies and industrial actors) are essential components of an effective security regime and its sustainability.

International cooperation can play a key role in human resource development and education and training in nuclear security, maintaining a well-trained cadre of technical experts and enhancing nuclear security culture. For several years, international cooperation in this area has been strengthening at various levels and in various ways.

In this article, a very brief description of the importance of physical protection systems for nuclear facilities will be discussed. Asystematic and measurable approach to the implementation of a PPS will be described in a comprehensive manner. For this purpose, the design objectives of PPS will be discussed. Various deterrence measures will be described with the caution or not to depend on deterrence measures for protection of assets and must be supplemented by detection. It will also briefly introduce the main PPS functions, detection, delay and response along with the relationship of these functions. It will emphasize the function of detection, followed by delay and response. Specific performance measures of various functions of a PPS will be described, along with how these measures are combined to support a cost–benefit analysis. The process stresses the use of integrated systems combining people, procedures, and equipment to meet protection objectives.

This paper provides a brief summary of the basic definitions, principles and guidelines currently used to implement nuclear security measures and protect radioactive sources during their use, storage and transport.