Ebook: The Protection of Critical Energy Infrastructure Against Emerging Security Challenges

The main objective of this Advanced Research Workshop is to investigate the security risks to critical energy infrastructure, namely cyber and terrorist attacks, as well as to identify opportunities for public-private partnerships to meet these risks. Using the case study of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, the workshop provides a unique forum to address the issue of critical infrastructure protection, which has been identified as a security priority of Georgia, the partner country in this ARW. The workshop has provided an excellent forum for experts and stakeholders from government, academia and the private sector for the exchange of information and best practices.

According to open sources (e.g. the database provided by the ETH Zurich Center for Security Studies (CSS)) critical energy infrastructure (CEI), such as oil and gas pipelines, storage infrastructures and electricity grids are becoming a target of criminal and terrorist attacks.

Since the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration, Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection (CEIP) has been identified as one of the areas of energy security where NATO can play a role, in particular through raising awareness of the topic and exchanging information and best practices. The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept confirms NATO’s role in CEIP where NATO can add value. The Strategic Concept also provides opportunities for NATO to cooperate with partners on this issue. The workshop receives strong organizational support by the Atlantic Councils of Georgia and Albania as well as the Atlantic Treaty Association. Representatives from these bodies will be leading the organizational team of the workshop.

The Trans Adriatic Pipeline has been chosen as an appropriate case study as it is widely valued as an important contribution to diversify European energy supply, passing through the territories of NATO and partner countries. Ensuring its protection against potential disruptions by terrorist and/or cyber- attacks provides a valuable opportunity for collaborative efforts between NATO and partner countries to enable the stable flow of energy resources.

The ARW applied the TAP as an important case study to discuss the best practices in critical energy infrastructure protection. For this purpose, workshop brought together a multidisciplinary group of experts from relevant public authorities and the private sector. They do not only possess strong subject matter expertise but also represent the host countries of the TAP. This also includes contributions by representatives from the governmental authorities.

In dedicated panels, the workshop addressed the current state of the art in critical energy infrastructure protection against terrorist and cyber threats. It has taken stock of the protective measures for critical energy infrastructure with a focus on integrated security solutions that require close cooperation between all public and private stakeholders involved. The workshop proceeded with a panel on the value of NATO as a facilitator of public-private partnerships. The final was dedicated to the lessons learned in establishing effective security measures in the case of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline. Special attention was given to the experiences of cooperation between public and private stakeholders.

The overall findings of the workshop and concrete recommendations was collected by a side panel and presented to the participants.

In conclusion, the ARW wanted to provide added value contributions to NATO’s role in critical energy infrastructure protection and the Alliance’s Strategic Objective of Partnership.

The Protection of Critical Energy Infrastructure (CEIP) has been placed higher in the political international agenda in the last ten years as Energy security is now a prominent issue given the dependence of many NATO’s Member States on unreliable suppliers. In this context, the international organizations such as NATO, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), International Energy Agency (IEA) and the European Union (EU) are playing an increasingly important role. Likewise, private stakeholders have much at stake.

This chapter argues that in the new security reality after the Cold War, NATO and partner nations need to reconsider the approach to energy security. Using modern technology in the age of globalization, non-state actors have started to threaten critical infrastructures that ensure our commodity and welfare. At the same time, energy thirst and the pursuit of cheap energy have significantly affected the environment. As a result, the concept of energy security, understood as the process of securing supply, needs to be changed.

Nowadays, critical infrastructure protection is highly relevant in the transmission networks and for companies responsible for these issues. The Latvian transmission system operator is responsible for providing reliable and stable transmission network operation in different system modes and high quality energy supply to the energy consumers and distribution system operators. Reliable network operation is the main base of transmission infrastructure modernization, future network development, protection of the objects’ systems, and physical protection of objects.

The fundamental function of the state, is to ensure the existence and sustainable development of the human society, which is not possible without ensuring the “safe space”– a space in which the human security level is acceptable. Human security depends on several assets, including infrastructure.

In the first quarter of the 21^st century, energy supply and CIP security phenomena play a crucial role in the world economy and are essential for the development of contemporary society. Modern state way of life is strongly connected with critical energy infrastructures such as oil and gas pipelines, nuclear and conventional power plants, maritime and railroad transports, military and economic facilities. This paper discusses the critical infrastructure protection and southern gas corridor policies in terms of energy supply security.

The complexity of the task of protecting the electricity transmission system is increasing, taking into account multiple trans-boundary risks, factors influencing its vulnerability, grids’ changing architecture and patterns of public opposition or support for upgrading existing lines or construction of new ones. Several best practices have been developed based on different research projects supported by the European Commission, addressing each phase of risk reduction for critical infrastructure, such as risk assessment, mitigation and management. In this publication we are discussing the best practices developed for different phases of the process of risk governance. These practices include assessment, the communication between science and practice, and stakeholders’ involvement and public acceptance.

Smart grids use intelligent transmission and distribution networks to deliver electricity. This approach aims to improve the electric system’s reliability, security, and efficiency through two-way communication of consumption data and dynamic optimization of electric-system operations, maintenance, and planning. The smart grid, in fact, incorporates many resources, applications, and enabling technologies like smart meters, standards, and protocols that can raise many security issues and advantages as well.

Protecting critical energy infrastructure is necessary to ensure economy’s functioning. The scope of this paper is to highlight potential areas through which NATO and private risk management and security companies can potentially cooperate in order to maximize the protection ensured to all actors involved in operations related to critical energy infrastructure. Three sections will feature this paper and a set of strategic recommendation aimed at facilitating additional consideration about the subject will be provided.

Energy security is a key component of the European Energy policy 2030. Within this framework the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline is an infrastructure essential to ensuring security supply for Europe and exploiting the new gas sources from the Southern Gas Corridor. TAP is not only strategic for Europe, but it is also a critical energy infrastructure in terms of economic development for Italy and the other two TAP hosting countries Albania and Greece.

The Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP project) as a part of Southern Gas Corridor will contribute to Economic Growth in Transit Countries, boost the countries’ roles as energy hubs in the region, directly contribute to GDP through taxes, direct and indirect employment during construction and operation, procurement of goods and services via eligible local suppliers, social and environmental investments (community investment programmes), spillover effects: news skills and expertise for companies and workers. Due to the guarantee of a sustainable development of the Albanian economy and the aim of guaranteeing energy security of supply, the energy infrastructure is considered of high importance. The trans-boundary element of this infrastructure is considered a key element with regard to the protection of the energy infrastructure. To ensure security in the construction and operation of the TAP pipeline, the Albanian state institutions have defined commitments and concrete tasks which are included in the document of Host Governmental Agreement. Taking into account the potential threats has made the successful development of the TAP project in Albania possible. The state administration has always been very supportive of the project. Albania has a considerable experience with the Protection of Critical Energy Infrastructure that might be applied to secure the TAP.

This is an especially challenging period for Europe’s energy security. Security of supply is certainly not a new issue for European governments and stakeholders. However, global events and most notably the situation in Ukraine have added a new dimension and increasing Europe’s resilience is now regarded as urgent. Greece has assumed a key role in the EU’s long term strategy to increase energy security, through strategies for diversification.

By virtue of its position, Greece is contributing to the opening of the Southern Corridor and is well prepared to transit gas from the Caspian, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe through TAP, IGI Poseidon and the proposed Eastern Mediterranean pipelines, as well as to make available LNG supplies to the Balkans through the Aegean LNG and IGB Systems.

This NATO Science for Peace and Security Advanced Research Workshop has not only highlighted the most important topics related to the protection of critical energy infrastructure. With an interdisciplinary group of experts, the workshop also identified a set of concrete future activities that aim to help Allies and partners in addressing their most prevalent challenges in this field. This contribution spotlights these findings and seeks to promote the recommendations for activities in international settings, as supported by the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme.