Ebook: Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus

With the end of the Cold War the Black Sea area has seen the proliferation of international organizations while the stalemated security challenges symbolized by the three frozen conflicts remain: Moldova vs. Transniestria; Armenia vs. Azerbaijan; Georgia vs. Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia. Identifying the region as a multi-polar system the chapter explores the dynamics among the major actors as well as between the major and lesser actors. This includes conflicts, negotiations and alliances. Because of the pervading mistrust among the actors the paper concludes that a comprehensive solution to the security issues in the region would be the most likely to produce successful negotiations of the frozen conflicts.

With its European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI CBC), the EU emphasises a strong policy commitment to promote cross-border co-operation as a vehicle for regional development and the advancement of cohesion goals. This policy operates from the assumption, furthermore, that the strategic development of urban networks across borders will be a central element in positively exploiting increasing interaction between the EU and its neighbours. However, to what extent do existing policy instruments actually facilitate such networking? Upon closer scrutiny, it becomes clear that territoriality principles regarding the use of EU funds could create a distinct policy gap between “internal” development and “external” networking. While cross-border co-operation (CBC) and the Europe-wide support of cross-border, interregional and transnational cooperation are now firmly embedded within the EU's Cohesion Policy, CBC links to projects involving neighbouring states are as yet relatively weak. This case study of Finnish-Russian co-operation indicates that simultaneous processes of inclusion and exclusion operate in terms of the interaction of governance mechanisms of Cohesion Policy and ENPI CBC. We argue that a too strict separation of EU internal and external policy activities would be counterproductive to pro-active strategies aimed at avoiding wider divisions between the EU and its neighbouring regions. For this reason, the issue of policy innovation, of combining internal consolidation of the EU with external engagement and co-operation, should be explored and will be taken up by this paper.

This article examines the persistence and conflict resolution potential of so-called protracted conflicts in the former Soviet Union, employing all four relevant case studies from the post-Soviet sphere and analyzes the capacity of the EU and OSCE to positively intervene in these conflicts. There currently exists a dearth of both theoretical and empirical research on post-Soviet on de facto states and on the place of the EU and OSCE as actor in the conflicts from which they have evolved. This article makes a modest attempt to address the existing lacunae by providing an analysis based primarily on semi-structured interviews with key personnel involved in the unrecognized/partially recognized states, in the states from which they have de facto seceded and with those in the EU and OSCE responsible for devising and/or implementing policies on the protracted conflicts. The article produces an analysis of intervention involving the EU and OSCE in four case studies, namely Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria.

This article examines conceptual change in the definition of EU policies of CBC in the context of the shaping of common foreign policies of the Union. The analysis focuses on changes in the definitions of CBC from the first INTERREG programs to present-day European Neighborhood Policies. The aim is to understand the conceptual shifts against the background of changing political agendas ranging from economic and social cohesion to pre-integration, deepening integration and the constitution of the political Union. The paper aims to contributing to the discussion on the formation of EU policies of common foreign affairs by asking what kind of discursive legacies and maybe even institutional path dependencies earlier programs of CBC have left to present-day policies of external relations. The ultimate question is: what kind of effects have CBC policy frames and instruments had on the role of the EU as a foreign political actor, and on the normative or soft power approach the EU is said to represent?

This article examines how inter-governmental institutions such as regional organizations may affect cross-border cooperation. In doing so the focus of analysis becomes the wider Black Sea area where there is a parallel process of border areas cooperation and of regional, inter-governmental policy coordination, the latter led by the organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Institutionalized collaboration between sub-state actors across borders has been encouraged in the Black Sea area as a means of practical problem-solving in a broad range of fields reflecting a top-down approach. Still, regional, inter-governmental institutions such as BSEC by adhering to politics of state interest have played a limited role in providing resources for cross-border cooperation as they have been neglecting the role of non-state actors. The securitization of cross-border cooperation comes as the outcome of the seriousness of transnational organized crime harbored, destined to or transiting the Black Sea countries and the high security dilemma among the Black Sea states.

This article focuses on the evolution of cooperation and mutual perceptions of two neighboring states: Romania and the Republic of Moldova. It underlines regional development and the way in which entrepreneurship, cooperation and development, take place at the border of the two states. The article's main objectives are the description of the strategies and priorities defined by the action of people engaged in regional development and entrepreneurship at the border level, the description of motivations, positive effects and problems in this process, the impact of the EU and national policies on these processes.. Data has been collected, analyzed and interpreted, starting with European, national and regional documents, regarding regional development and cross-border entrepreneurship, from political declarations of the representatives of the two countries, to basic interviews with local and regional stakeholders, with representatives of civil organizations, and small and medium enterprises who are involved in cross-border cooperation projects at the Romanian-Moldavian border as well. The main conclusions emphasize the importance of European and national politics and financing for the evolution of cooperation, for regional development and for cross-border partnership. Implications for future research and practice are discussed.

Ukraine, as part of the Black Sea region, found itself on the crossroads of the great powers' interests long ago. Having had little chance to develop its current official status as a non-aligned state, on the way to neutrality, by its own resources, Ukraine brought itself into a peculiar, almost deadlocked, situation: it appears to be outside existing security spaces in Europe. Always being ‘in between’ helps little in defending national interests. The concept of the ‘“New” Euro-Atlantism’ gives a theoretical chance to combine different security spaces in Europe in order to share the security interests of Ukraine, together with those of the other European countries, including the Russian Federation and EU members. Such an agenda is also a challenge to the Black Sea region, which, on the one hand, is part of the Euro-Atlantic security space, but on the other is still a divided European periphery.

The Black Sea region is a battleground between two competitive security visions, traditionally labeled as modernist and post-modernist. The main divergence in security visions is due to the security identities of the actors. Analysis of Ukrainian, Russian and Turkish security policies may bring us to the conclusion that these actors represent different security orders. So far, in lots of cases the security identities of parties are founded on mutually exclusive premises and provide for only a situational cooperation. It is quite unlikely that the gap between the different security orders will be bridged in the near future.

This article aims at a comprehensive evaluation of Turkey's foreign policy in the Caucasus after 2008. An assessment related to the responses given and the steps taken by Turkey with respect to the emergent events would facilitate the comprehension of Turkish foreign policy parameters in general. Throughout the article, Turkey's foreign policy in the South Caucasus will be discussed under topics such as the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, which was proposed by Turkey as an attempt to restore the regional order and stability, the Armenian Opening, Turkey-Azerbaijan relations, commercial and economic ties, and energy cooperation.

Since the fall of 2010, Georgia launched its new policy towards Russia's North Caucasus that includes institution of a visa-free travel regime for the residents of this region, as well as recognition by the Georgian Parliament of “Circassian Genocide”, etc. The policy is aimed at attracting the goodwill of the peoples of the North Caucasus and is based on the understanding that while this region is part of the Russian Federation, the attitudes and actions of the people residing there are important for Georgia's security. However, Georgia's new policy was met by strong criticism from the Russian government and fears in the West that it may have destabilizing effect in this volatile region.

National borders exemplify a number of paradoxes: the boundary both separates and unites neighboring states. The border delimits and defines the state and its territory, and disputes in borderlands can eventually affect international relations and regional stability. In regions like the South Caucasus, where states are weak, there is a possibility for the conflicts of one country to flow over into neighboring countries, and for states to become entangled with conflicts there. This article explores how the form of such cross-border conflict dynamics relates to the character of the two states in question. This is done through the comparative analysis of Georgia's cross-border contacts with Russia, including the present situation in the separatist entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The case of the Russia-Georgia divide is important for challenging traditional explanations of foreign policy and for learning possible ways to de-escalate dangerous cross-border conflicts.

This article discusses the influence of energy on security in the South Caucasus and Caspian region in the post-Soviet period. It claims that while energy is an important factor affecting security developments in the region, it is not the main driver. For instance, energy has not been an important factor in the emergence of the major conflicts that afflict the area: Nagorno-Karabagh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the secessionist conflicts of Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia). In addition, serving as major energy exporters or transit states of energy to Western markets has provided quite limited security benefits and has not enabled the exporters and transit states to regain control of their occupied territories. Moreover, energy flows have not served as an inducement for peace in the region, and most likely energy supply will not serve this function in the future. Possession of significant oil and natural gas resources, however, has kept the energy producers of the Caspian relatively important on the Western security radar screen and thus increased their capability to carry out independent policies. In addition, control of energy infrastructure and influence over the export routes of oil and natural gas has been an important focus of the attempts of regional and global powers to gain influence in the region. Moreover, the region's energy transit states possess influence over their neighboring landlocked energy producers. In addition, possession of significant oil and gas reserves as endowed Azerbaijan with the resources to build a formative military force and this will affect the long-term security trends in the region.