Military cyber threats are becoming more frequent, complex, destructive, and coercive. Nowhere is the ‘Fog of War’ thicker than it is in cyberspace. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any conflict in the future that would not include a cyber dimension.
Exactly how to achieve better cyber defense varies from organization to organization and government to government. What is clear is that cyber defense should be addressed as we would any other critical risk – through identification, analysis, and resolution, whether by avoidance, acceptance, transfer, or mitigation. What makes cyber risk different from other risks, though, is the pervasiveness of its scope. It touches all aspects of an organization or a society, and, moreover, necessarily involves diverse, external actors.
Take a well-understood and well-managed risk: the risk of fire. We have extensive building codes, based on empirical data that define standards on everything from building materials, fire systems, entrances and exits. The response time—and response actions—for a fire department are similarly well-known and defined.
This is different for cyber. Static standards for security, as are possible with fire, do not work for cyber defense—technology is constantly changing. What each employee should do in the event of an incident is also harder to define. And, companies are very much reliant on external vendors (e.g., to patch their technology), and vendors have their own varied, internal risk management processes. Software vendors will not, cannot, and likely should not standardize the way that a fire department does.
This means that all of us need to take responsibility for increasing our defenses while realizing that we cannot control all aspects of our security—we will not be able to be perfect all the time. As our world becomes ever more cyber-enabled, we will necessarily continue to have risks and failures. Indeed, we need to think about cyber defense in terms of resilience. That is, being able to prepare for and adapt to changing threat conditions while withstanding and rapidly recovering from attacks to infrastructure availability. In other words, we must continuously get better at both defense and recovery—even while preparing to operate in a degraded environment.
Partnerships are crucial in this regard. This NATO Science for Peace Programme publication is a testament to the way NATO engages with partner nations and academia. I hope it also serves as a unique reference when it comes to some of the most pressing challenges related to implementing effective cyber defenses on the policy, technical and operational level.
Christian LIFLÄNDER
Head, Cyber Defense Section, Emerging Security Challenges Division, NATO Headquarters
Brussels, June 2019