The rapid development of e-commerce has brought new opportunities for developing and upgrading agricultural wholesale markets. This paper constructs a two-party game model of agricultural wholesale markets and merchants through evolutionary game theory and analyses the conditions for the integration of the parties and the stability of the equilibrium point of the system. It is concluded that when establishing an e-commerce platform in the agricultural wholesale market, when it cannot build its e-commerce platform profitably, it is impossible to induce the merchants to use the e-commerce platform by giving them subsidies from the agricultural wholesale market. Suppose the agricultural wholesale market can build its e-commerce platform profitably. In that case, it can give subsidies to merchants to induce them to use it, and the maximum subsidy can be given within a certain limit. Increasing the profit of the self-built e-commerce platform of the wholesale market of agricultural products is conducive to promoting the self-built e-commerce platform of the wholesale market of agricultural products; increasing the profit of merchants using the self-built e-commerce platform of the wholesale market of agricultural products can promote the use of the e-commerce platform of the wholesale market of agricultural products by merchants.