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Auctions can be used to solve resource allocation problems where tasks have to be assigned to resources in such a way that no resource gets overused and an objective function is optimized. In some cases a robust solution is preferable to the optimal solution as it may still be applicable even if unexpected changes in the environment occur. In this paper we present a robustness mechanism for auctions, producing feasible and near optimal solutions even if non-planned events occur. The proposed mechanism has been used in a real problem obtaining successful results.
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