On the basis of Ned Block’s distinction between cognitive accessibility and phenomenology (previously known as access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness), this paper argues that social robots equipped with mere cognitive accessibility but no phenomenal consciousness could nonetheless be morally competent to engage in moral deliberation and decision-making in scenarios involving moral dilemmas. Inspired by Bertram F. Malle’s advocacy of moral competence, this paper aims to establish moral competence of social robots without assuming that they have achieved the status of moral agents. Drawing on a survey conducted by the author with the human-in-the-loop methodology, the paper presents sample scenarios involving ethical dilemmas in assisted suicide, truth-telling, rescue operations, and law enforcement intervention, and argues that social robots with sufficiently constructed cognitive access will have the resources—being able to cognitively access and evaluate the relevant information and context—to handle these dilemmas in alignment with human values. What is required for social robots to obtain moral competence is not the ability to feel, to empathize, or to know what it is like to be them. It is rather the cognitive architecture of reasoning, information processing, verbal communication, aided with an appropriate moral framework. This paper employs the moral framework Confucian virtue ethics.