This book, Modern Technologies Enabling Innovative Methods for Maritime Monitoring and Strengthening Resilience in Maritime Critical Infrastructures, presents 23 papers delivered at the NATO Advanced Training Course (ATC) hosted in Agadir, Morocco, and held in hybrid format from 15–20 January 2024.

The workshop was attended by 23 speakers (21 in person), and 41 attendees all of them present. This NATO ATC proved to be a wonderful experience for many who attended it. There were speakers and attendees from 12 countries, all seeking modern technologies to enable innovative methods for maritime monitoring and the strengthening of resilience in maritime critical infrastructures.

The ATC focused on an interdisciplinary approach to monitoring and protecting critical maritime infrastructures and increasing their resilience. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has brought new risks, with both physical and cyber-attacks, often combined as a hybrid threat. The sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, together with other recent incidents, has made it clear that the resilience of critical infrastructure is under threat. Whether the target be pipelines, transport routes or undersea cables, a disruption in one country can have a cascading effect, with ramifications for other countries. Action is urgently needed to increase the capacity of NATO Countries to protect themselves against attacks on critical infrastructure, both in the EU and its direct neighborhood.

European NATO Countries are closely interconnected and interdependent, which, although it makes them stronger and more efficient, also renders them more vulnerable in the event of an incident. The European NATO Countries have a particular role to play with respect to infrastructures that cross borders or provide cross-border services, thus impacting the interests of several European NATO Countries. The importance of the subsea data cables that transport most of our data and are critical for global communication and the digital economy is an example of these cross-border services, and should be highlighted. Clear identification of such infrastructure and the entities operating them, together with a collective commitment to protect them, is in the interest of all NATO Countries.

Legal frameworks, such as Document 52022DC0551 -Proposal for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on a coordinated approach by the Union to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure, COM/2022/551 final, for the protection of critical infrastructure elements have gradually been developed in European Countries, but are still missing in other, mainly non-EU, countries.

For the past decade, the attention of the developed democratic nations has been focused on the protection of vital objects, with science and research gradually focusing more attention on security and critical infrastructure protection. Less attention has been paid to critical maritime infrastructures and the need to increase their resilience.

Maritime infrastructures are ‘critical’ because they are fundamental to the working of societies and economies. They play a crucial role in supply, in the functioning of the economy, the maintenance of mobility and the deployment of renewable energies. They are so deeply inscribed that most of the time they are invisible and are designed to function without raising any attention. Since they exist in the background, receiving little scrutiny, they are also particularly vulnerable.

It is worth noting that the maritime industry accounts for 90% of commercial trade exchanges carried out worldwide, whereby the supply chains of the main production sectors are heavily dependent on it. This maritime sector, as a vital part of the global economy, must therefore be protected from threats and cyber attacks. A single incident could lead to a major environmental or economic disaster, possibly even one capable of causing loss of life. The maritime sector is now in the process of adapting to the new technological environment demanded by information technologies and is integrating operational technology with the aim of optimizing management processes.

In 2017, the MAERSK shipping company faced an attack of the Petya virus, which temporarily limited its commercial and logistical operations, damaging not only the company’s reservation system and slowing container tracking, but also causing congestion in 76 ports operated by its subsidiary, APM Terminals, around the world. There are more than 50,000 merchant ships operating internationally transporting all types of cargo. These ships must berth in critical infrastructures such as ports, platforms, refineries, pipelines, power stations, etc. in order to carry out their usual operations.

Due to the exceptional growth of container shipping, ports have become one of the most important links in the logistics chain in recent years. the possible illicit activities of cybercrime or cyber terrorism in these CIs can affect the economic and institutional activities of the countries involved, and are always the cause of losses to multiple economic actors, due to the collapse of processes and services. The in-service monitoring of ports may involve several aspects, depending on the type of port and the target of the monitoring. The specification for in-service monitoring is because in many cases, monitoring during construction is aimed at optimizing the design/construction process. The construction of large ports usually takes several years to complete and may involve settlement of the seabed, erosion by waves and streams, tilting of caissons etc. It requires a large number of topographic and bathymetric surveys. In-service monitoring on the other hand can be aimed at: (i) improving knowledge of the site or monitoring the effects of the structure on the environment; (ii) validating design hypotheses or applicable standards; and (iii) serving as a basis for maintenance operations.

The design of such a monitoring system should be addressed at acquiring information able to characterize the state of the entire structure. A common aspect is the monitoring of environmental conditions (wind, waves, streams, dynamics of nearby coastlines) and the evolution of the seabed close to the breakwater foundations, because this may disclose a tendency to erosion, soil liquefaction or soil failures which might cause the collapse of the breakwater. It should be noted that the presence of a breakwater always alters the equilibrium of a coastal area. In both cases, a clear understanding of the potential failure mechanisms is crucial in designing a monitoring program.

Resilience is the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction.

Many disciplines have devised their own definitions of resilience. These differ in their focus and associated objectives, which may be of a technological, economic, environmental, or even social nature. In technology-related fields, resilience is often seen as the ability of technology systems to continue to operate, even in the event of the failure of specific subsystems due to internal or external disturbances. Typical solutions include system layouts with redundant components, and the provision of backup functionalities which ultimately ensure that a nominal resistance is achieved or increased when faced with internal or external disruptions. In sociotechnical systems, the emphasis is instead on hazard management, damage limitation and the recovery of functionality and performance. Due to its critical nature, the resilience of maritime infrastructures cannot be considered separately from the related safety and security aspects. Nominal resistance is a design criterion, and determines the need for proactive and reactive safety and security measures in technological and socio-technical disciplines, with the aim of ultimately achieving the desired operational performance under current conditions. Nonetheless, resilience is an ongoing challenge that needs to be managed operationally throughout a maritime infrastructure’s entire lifecycle. This requires agile safety and security management that is integrated into the technological and sociotechnical aspects of the maritime infrastructure. Therefore, when we speak about critical maritime infrastructure protection, we are considering it in the context of the entire spectrum of possible threats, which are classified into three main types: (i) natural events; (ii) technical/technological failure/human error/accident; and (iii) intentional acts such as terrorism, crime, or war. If the CI elements (physical and IT) are to be protected, the essential task is prevention, i.e., discovering and predicting the threats.

The aim of the ATC was to cover the problem in an interdisciplinary manner, with the innovative approach of using advanced methods for monitoring and protection.

Morocco was selected for the location of the workshop as a NATO Partner Country with a pressing need for knowledge of possible threats and an awareness of security developments such as those concerning early warnings with a view to preventing crises. Morocco has an extensive coastline which includes two different maritime ecosystems, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean. The coastline of Morocco has the potential to be an essential tool for enhancing social and economic stability. Poverty and malnutrition could be eradicated if a sufficient food supply were available from fish, so it is vital that overexploitation and pollution be discouraged, as these may lead to disaster. Furthermore, income-generating activities such as tourism should be encouraged by developing clean marine biodiversity. For these results to be achieved, the use of modern technologies enabling innovative methods of maritime monitoring and increasing the resilience of maritime critical infrastructures is fundamental for the development of Morocco..

Those attending the ATC were researchers and students specializing in the security of infrastructures (security studies, infrastructural engineering, electrical engineering, etc.), security officers dealing with the security challenges of critical infrastructure, stake holders, and experts in terrorism or other violent threats. They were looking for specialized knowledge from experts who deal with problems related to CI protection.

There were two most significant benefits for attendees:

∙ acquaintance with and knowledge of the development of modern technologies which, when applied to technical protection systems, can provide safety and security for critical infrastructure concentrated on civil engineering objects.

∙ shared knowledge and ideas for future scientific and technical activities in the field of research and development of the protection of critical infrastructure using elevated monitoring systems and high-performance structural materials.

The first part of the ATC was dedicated to the analysis of the various threats to maritime critical infrastructure and to legal aspects, mainly in the context of a Moroccan point of view. The approach of NATO Countries was presented to disseminate this to participating NATO Partner Countries.

The second part focused on new methodologies such as Unmanned Systems (USs) and sensor networks, which may help to recognize various threats (terrorism-explosion, crime-cyber-attacks, natural events – flooding etc.), and on the modeling of behavior of critical infrastructure elements under such threats, with the aim of designing adequate means of protection from the new intentional actions, not only by USs.

USs have been growing rapidly in popularity in recent years. Tactical USs are now used extensively by the military and various security services, while professional USs are becoming increasingly common in a variety of civilian fields. This expansion in the use of USs is due to advances in technology, as well as to their versatility, and to the reduction in size, risk, and cost that remotely operated systems offer because there is no pilot or operator on board. USs include ground control stations (GCS), data communication links, and a range of unmanned aerial (UAV), ground (UGV) and underwater (UUV) vehicles. USs are being used more and more in mainstream applications as the technology matures, leading to more ways of refining how platforms are deployed and integrated into teams of workers.

Performance in autonomy comes mainly from the massive use of advanced IT technology as the core of the USs. Unfortunately, an obvious drawback is that wireless USs are heavily exposed to risks related to the IT subsystems. The data is so valuable, in fact, that the companies deploying USs aren’t the only ones interested in getting their hands on it, with some people even willing to steal it. Operators should consider the security of data collected via USs as a critical part of their risk management program. Questions of cybersecurity in the domain of USs has become more important, as has the potential for the misuse of small USs for criminal and other malicious purposes. These are growing developments that need to be addressed in education and training, so that qualified personnel are able to engage these challenges. USs can also be used for the forecasting and prevention of natural catastrophes through the frequent and punctual monitoring of the maritime territory, for the monitoring of existing critical infrastructure elements, and for discovering the defects of elements and preventing against failure.

The ATC paid particular attention to maritime unmanned systems. These are becoming more popular for improving safety and efficiency while reducing operational costs. The use of USs is a game changer in maritime technology. They can deliver benefits across a broad range of missions, such as the detection and clearing of mines, the monitoring and protection of undersea lines of communication and underwater cables, maritime situational awareness, and the finding and tracking of submarines. They will also reduce the costs and increase the safety of such operations. Unmanned systems can help to overcome the constraints faced by traditional, crew-dependent maritime platforms, such as ships or submarines, in terms of the areas they can cover, direct and indirect costs, and personnel. Mine-clearing operations, for example, pose risks to the health and safety of crew members; autonomous systems can take over this task while crew members supervise the operation from a safe distance. Working alongside traditional naval assets, USs can also improve situational awareness, which is critical in ensuring free access to the seas.

One part of the ATC was dedicated to data analysis and modeling. The application of computer modeling software for forecasting dangerous natural hazards, and the mapping of the current state of risk factors in particular, as well as the process of defect detection through the data fusion of processed images and vibration measurements. Automation in defect image acquisition by USs, embedding sensor systems to revalorize and transform elements and structures into self-diagnostic elements, and data-driven automatic alert procedures in monitored maritime structures were also covered. The ATC also provided essential information to allow the detection of risks, with a significant portion dedicated to the possibilities for the analysis, elaboration, and modeling of threats to critical infrastructure.

The ATC was divided into 4 blocks.

Block 1: General aspects of strengthening the resilience of maritime critical infrastructure

1.1 Protection and resilience of maritime critical infrastructures in Morocco

1.2 Protection and resilience of maritime critical infrastructure in NATO Countries.

Block 2: Unmanned Systems and sensor network technology for monitoring threats to maritime critical infrastructures.

2.1 Unmanned Systems for maritime exploration

2.2 Sensor network and technologies for monitoring critical infrastructures.

Block 3: Monitoring, data analysis and structural modeling

3.1 Monitoring and forecasting of natural catastrophes

3.2 Modeling and data analyses.

Block 4: Cybersecurity and protection of IT maritime infrastructures, plus one practical section: Practical training activities.

The practical section was held after the theoretical interdisciplinary presentation, during which participants were able to acquire practical skills related to the presented areas, such as using maritime drones for building and critical infrastructure inspection, 3D mapping in the laboratory, use of environmental monitoring systems, and building information modeling and the finite element modeling of critical infrastructure elements.

The event offered attendees the opportunity to consider many profound ways in which unmanned systems and sensor network technology can be used for monitoring threats to maritime critical infrastructures.

A technical visit to the Higher Institute of Maritime Fisheries (ISPM) and to Research Vessel Sina 2 of the National Institute for Fisheries Research contributed to the impact of this ATC on speakers and attendees, as well as on the wider scientific community of participants in the follow-on activities, such as joint research projects, innovative courses, and the design, development and testing of new maritime applications.

It is worth mentioning the presentation from Setelgroup, an Italian company located in Rome, of their innovative Unmanned Vehicle suitable for the monitoring of maritime critical infrastructures in an amphibious environment.

The practical lesson, Marine drones for environmental protection, held by Emanuele Della Volpe, Green Tech Solution, Italy as part of the onsite practical training activities proved to be a great success. The central part of the lesson concerned a description of the identification, classification, and recovery system of floating marine waste with an autonomous catamaran, with an explanation of the main phases of the process. During the experimental lesson, it was possible for trainees to attend the operational phases of planning and execution of seabed monitoring with ROVs.

Finally, the presentations of two Ukranian researchers, Iryna Sitak and Natalia Shyriaieva from the National Technical University Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute attracted great attention. Sitak spoke on Maritime Infrastructure and Its Crucial Role in Ukraine’s Economy: Challenges and Impact Before and During the Full-Scale Invasion in February 2022. Shyriaieva dealt with Rebuilding Ukraine’s Economy: Leveraging Maritime Infrastructure for Resilience and Growth.

During the Closing Ceremony a Certificate of Attendance was offered to all participants.

ATC website: https://www.atcnato-universiapolis.com