We propose a framework for argumentation-basednegotiation where Agents' constraints such as budget and time play a key role in determining the set of offers agents can make. Each offer is supported by arguments and each agent tries to achieve an agreement using arguments to persuade the opponent to make concession. An agreement is achieved when the last offer is accepted. Two concession and two acceptance strategies are identified and their different combinations result in four types of negotiating agents. The paper discusses completeness, Pareto optimality, and Nash equilibrium results with respect to these types.
IOS Press, Inc.
6751 Tepper Drive
Clifton, VA 20124
Tel.: +1 703 830 6300
Fax: +1 703 830 2300 email@example.com
(Corporate matters and books only) IOS Press c/o Accucoms US, Inc.
For North America Sales and Customer Service
West Point Commons
Lansdale PA 19446
Tel.: +1 866 855 8967
Fax: +1 215 660 5042 firstname.lastname@example.org