The argumentation turn in logic paves the way for importing problems and ideas from general philosophy of science into logical formalisms. The main problems are: when faced with an inconsistency, how do we choose the hypotheses/beliefs that are the most plausible candidates for revision? Do we really need to react to each single inconsistency or should we focus on predictive success and temporarily ignore “minor” inconsistencies? How do we distinguish ad hoc adjustments from heuristically fruitful revisions? These questions call for a sophisticated notion of “epistemic entrenchment”. The basic idea has played an important role both in the area of belief revision (Gärdenfors and Makinson) and, under different denominations, in that of general philosophy of science (Quine, Kuhn, Lakatos), with little or no interaction between them. The main aim of this talk is to bring the philosophical debate on this notion to the attention of the formal argumentation community and suggest how this interaction could lead to substantial advances in the field.