As a guest user you are not logged in or recognized by your IP address. You have
access to the Front Matter, Abstracts, Author Index, Subject Index and the full
text of Open Access publications.
Research in psychology has found that subjects regularly exhibit a conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Additional research has led to the finding of other fallacies in probability judgment, including disjunction and conditional fallacies. Such analyses of judgments are critical because of the substantial amount of probability judgment done in business and organizational settings. However, previous research has been conducted in the environment of a single decision maker. Since business and other organizational environments also employ groups, it is important to determine the impact of groups on such cognitive fallacies. This paper finds that groups substantially mitigate the impact of probability judgment fallacies among the sample of subjects investigated. A statistical analysis, based on a binomial distribution, suggests that groups investigated here did not use consensus. Instead, if any one member of the group has correct knowledge about the probability relationships, then the group uses that knowledge and does not exhibit fallacy in probability judgment. These results suggest that at least for this setting, groups have a willingness to collaborate and share and use knowledge from the group.
This website uses cookies
We use cookies to provide you with the best possible experience. They also allow us to analyze user behavior in order to constantly improve the website for you. Info about the privacy policy of IOS Press.
This website uses cookies
We use cookies to provide you with the best possible experience. They also allow us to analyze user behavior in order to constantly improve the website for you. Info about the privacy policy of IOS Press.