In most attempts to model legal systems as formal argumentation systems, legal norms are viewed as an argumentation's system inference rules. Since in formal argumentation systems inference rules are generally assumed to be fixed and independent from the inferences they enable, this approach fails to capture the dialectical connection between norms and arguments, where on the one hand legal arguments are based on norms, and on the other hand the validity of norms depends on arguments. The validity of a new norm can be supported by referring to authoritative sources, such as legislation or precedent, but also through interpretations of such sources, or through analogies or a contrario arguments based on existing authoritative norms. In this contribution arguments about norms are modelled as the application of argument schemes to knowledge bases of facts and norms.
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