As a guest user you are not logged in or recognized by your IP address. You have
access to the Front Matter, Abstracts, Author Index, Subject Index and the full
text of Open Access publications.
In order to implement extended producer responsibility (EPR) and improve the efficiency of recycling as well as benefits, producers (demand-side of logistics) select the third-party to recycle and process waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE). The relationship between production enterprises and third-party reverse logistics providers is a principal-agent. Under the constraint that the third-party reverse logistics providers' environmental protection ability and effort level are asymmetric information, the principal-agent models between the production enterprises and third-party reverse logistics providers are established, and then the models are solved as well as influencing factors are analyzed. It is found that the more effort the third party reverse logistics providers (TPRLP) make to recycle waste, the greater the strength factor of incentive pay is and the bigger the cost coefficient of TPRLP is, the smaller the strength factor of incentive pay is.
This website uses cookies
We use cookies to provide you with the best possible experience. They also allow us to analyze user behavior in order to constantly improve the website for you. Info about the privacy policy of IOS Press.
This website uses cookies
We use cookies to provide you with the best possible experience. They also allow us to analyze user behavior in order to constantly improve the website for you. Info about the privacy policy of IOS Press.