The last decade has seen increasingly more interest in nuclear energy. Yet this nuclear renaissance poses many challenges. Power plants are long-term investments, which require significant infrastructure. The cost of reactors is unknowable. The forecast of nuclear power calls for substantial enhancements, but legal, financial, and regulatory frameworks must also be expanded. Sharon Squassoni contends that all options should be explored, and that nuclear energy may not be for every state. Today, the overwhelming majority of nuclear power production and the fuel cycle occur in the P-5 states, along with Japan and the Republic of Korea. However, a shift is occurring where nations outside this group are seeking nuclear energy. These states do not have nuclear security experience. Ivan Oelrich argues that the implications of widely proliferated national enrichment are dire; internationalization of enrichment is necessary to prevent such a scenario. This plan would be difficult to implement legally, but Oelrich drafts possible means of implementation. Safety, security and safeguards hold distinct definitions, but there are synergies between them. These synergies are the basis for a solid framework of security. Actual implementation of all three is still difficult though, and Laura Rookwood posits that an inter-disciplinary approach could work if those implementing it understand the synergies. Irakli Beridze asserts that the OPCW is in fact aware of these synergies, and is developing a security program that covers all of the pillars of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The OPCW wants to develop a permanent feedback mechanism between the OPCW and stakeholders by developing and implementing joint initiatives to support comprehensive national implementation of the convention and fostering of international cooperation.