By its very nature, a book of this kind can only be selective in the issues it treats. Some generalizations are in order, however. For example, security is not understood comprehensively from one portion of the extended geographical region under consideration to the other. As a result, certain countries and institutions have been quicker to adapt than others. It is on these success stories that we focus in part 2 of this work. Another generalization that can be made is that there seems to be a form of cleavage developing within the region between the ruling elites and the constituents. On the constituents' side, however, a number of outlets are appearing to prevent the return of blanket authoritarianism, despite the frequent charges of corruption, nationalism and administrative mismanagement which the region is often burdened with.

Those outlets represent the technical and functional devices developed from the civil society or from specialised agencies dedicated to the promotion of democratic principles and the continuation of reform. On the one hand, the technical features of those outlets have a crucial advantage; they are de-politicised. This means that the ensuing development is less the result of a particular agenda than the logical conclusion of an objective administrative or technical process. How education responds to the demands of security sector reform, for instance, is a case in point. Initially, the need for technological improvement was not merely pursued for the sake of economies of scale, crucial to States with scarce resources. In addition to this, it was believed, rightly in our opinion, that technological development was also a path to deeper integration, to better participation in Western processes. Evidently, speaking the same technological language is a sine qua non for cooperation on projects. It does not follow, however, that the impetus was to forge the sort of cooperative processes that went beyond political boundaries. But in effect, the main character of technology is its objectivity. Technology cannot be political, and therefore the people who participate on technological project cease to be political as well. When we say “cease to be political”, the meaning inferred here is that of a process that has the greater good at heart, rather than the needs of a particular regime. Dr. Belloni's analysis of the situation in the Western Balkans is right, and the existence of personal frictions within the bureaucratic process of security sector reform is self-evident, as outlined by Welch.

However, there are powerful indicators that technological solutions go far in depoliticising issues, and forcing the state to meet its obligations towards its constituents. The fact that it is the constituents themselves (and not bureaucrats) who often pilot technological improvements is not surprising; they are producing the systems and services that will serve as pure public goods. For example, the Faculty of Occupational Safety at the University of Nis in Serbia is promoting a series of courses and programmes to help first responders and researchers to deal with emergencies which are understood very comprehensively under Serbian law. It is evident, in view of the recent past, that Serbia's political instances are keen on elevating natural and manmade emergencies to the level of consequences of armed conflict and terrorism. This creates a natural propensity for the government to declare states of emergencies more often than it would have to, keeping the security sector at high readiness status. Nevertheless, it is foreseeable that most emergencies that will occur in the near future will likely be of an accidental or natural origin, and not from a systematic use of violence against the state (in the shape of political terrorism or attack from another country). This has oriented the scope of research and development at the Faculty of Occupational Safety in Nis to cater to remediation. In turn, the likelihood that the emergency will not be militant in nature means that the high-readiness of the security sector will be applied for the benefit of the totality of the population. Furthermore, in case of a massive emergency where local resources are insufficient, the re-orientation of the duties of the security sector would make it easier for neighbouring countries to come to Serbia's help. As stated in the Nikolic article, the programmes aim at enabling students to apply scientific solutions - not political ones - to emergency management challenges.

Indeed, if politics is defined by the aphorism of “who gets what by whom” within a parochial context, then the technological solutions enable a more rational, less emotional and biased distribution of resources. In the second contribution from the Faculty of Occupational Safety at Nis University, the authors stress how the links between actors and resources demand impartial systems to identify, analyse and distribute support in emergency response. The fact that Serbia is following a worldwide trend is also a strong indicator of increasing integration with recognized best practices. The application of those best practices takes place outside the political environment, and the technological and scientific aspects of the emergency management curriculum and systems turn the focus away from politics. In that sense, students, analysts, first responders and eventually decision-makers will look at emergency management less as a feature of political activity and more as one of public administration. In turn, this would have favourable consequences on internal stability (because the State is then seen as fulfilling its function impartially), and on bureaucratic deontology. As Welch suggested in the preceding section, institutional friction and rivalry within the bureaucracy is an impediment to capacity building. The manner in which some countries of the Western Balkans have developed capacity remains largely a matter of academia for now, but it is a step in the right direction, insofar as it keeps the political at arms' length. The solutions and tools devised in research institutes such as geographic analysis software, knowledge management portals and virtual slibraries emerge from dedicated research institutes, not from political parties. The inherent rationality of those tools and processes provides a means of emancipation for the practitioners and for the societies they serve. Velizar Shalamanov's “serious gaming” systems allow Bulgaria to develop the solutions to emergencies that could have their source from anywhere in the greater Black Sea region and from South Eastern Europe. As a result, the training exposes the analysts and practitioners to the realities of complex emergencies. The Bulgarian educational system and model requires foreign contact which further expose its officers to the experience of foreign agencies. In part, this contact, as well as the economic constraints faced by all countries of the EU and NATO have led Bulgaria to adopt technological solutions that support its integration of Euro-Atlantic norms. For one, the conception of “security” now encompasses many more definitions than the mere obligation of “defence”. For Bulgaria, virtual libraries and knowledge management tools enable the variety of actors within Bulgarian civil society to learn, train and exchange on the variety of security challenges that the State now faces. These are the means through which Bulgaria has chosen to address the governance challenges alluded to by Welch.

Technological applications are the means whereby critical features of the totalitarian past are being eradicated. For instance, a totalitarian regime relies on the wisdom of a single individual who is thought mistake-free. While history and common sense demonstrated this to be fallacious, it does not detract from the fact that such regimes have triggered learned behaviours that are difficult to get rid of. Self-criticism is one of those behavioural traits. At the Baltic Defence College, education performance measurement is not a benefit to the delivery of security curriculum only; it is the proof to the audience and to the institution itself that the shortcomings and successes are dependent upon the competence of many actors. In terms of governance, not knowing how a programme is performing is equal to not caring where an agency or institution is going. It makes short shrift of the attitudes of the audience that the institution is supposed to serve. Therefore, the mere act of asking the question “how are we doing” is testament to the desire of integrating Euro-Atlantic methods of governance. It also enables the institution to bridge the gap between what it teaches and how it acts. Here also, the system of lecturer evaluation by the students and of student evaluation by the lecturers takes place anonymously using value-free technological and statistical tools. The results enable the oversight teams to identify shortcoming in such a way as to seek correctives to problems rather than to people. The issue of governance is sensitive, and appears through many articles in this part as a work perpetually in progress. For example, the Canadian system whereby procurement is undertaken brings deliberate emphasis on the ambiguity inherent in the term “civilian control” and political meddling in the security sector. In the case of the Sea King Saga, the bureaucracy is driven into an educational role through the process of democratic oversight of defence spending in a context where corruption is politically alleged. It is not altogether abnormal that it be so. Here the bureaucracy is determined to serve the country, as it must owing to legal statutes. However, a democracy being what it is, few members of Parliament have the time to explore academically their relationship with the bureaucracy, and quite conveniently suppose that it serves the ruling party. It is not so. No country has the answer as to what optimal, ethical governance is. What the Canadian example offers is a system whereby the decision for procurement is transferred almost exclusively to the bureaucracy, dividing responsibility among many institutions, dividing the process in many sub-processes where, granted, political interference is always possible, but authority is more generally distributed.

Although not a “technological” solution per se, it nevertheless proposes a system whereby predictability is inserted, and where the preferences of the few do not supersede the deontology of the bureaucracy which has a greater interest in applying its processes and self-imposed rules. Governance becomes a matter of public administration which relies heavily on the rule of law. This, most of all, is what is to be remembered from Labarre's contribution. It is not that this solution can be imposed as a model for the Balkans or the greater Black Sea, but that they obey a need determined from within the society, a need that has been translated into a functional apolitical system. In many ways, the Balkan countries represented in this part have presented solutions in answer to an objective need, rather than the express wishes of political constituencies. The solutions presented in part 2 are all instances where the political aspect is removed from decision situations that are supposed to benefit the public at large. The Canadian example reveals the same kind of political axe-grinding as seen in the Western Balkans or the wider Black Sea area. Although the level of animosity between opponents may vary, it does not change the fact that certain processes are deeply interesting to political actors because of the rent opportunities they represent. The functional application of solutions does not address a critical ingredient of democratic governance and security sector reform, however, which is the rule of law. The space lacks here to discuss this topic in detail. However, the advantage of functional and technological solutions to emergency management, procurement, and education serves to heighten public awareness as to these issues. They also help articulate the States' efforts towards the public rather than the benefit of the regime in place.

Security sector and governance reform continue in the Western Balkans and in the greater Black Sea area, and beyond. This process will never be completed and will forever be the subject of increasing perfectibility. For now, the technological and systematic solutions discussed here offer the reader a glance at processes that are politics- and value-free, but which nevertheless represent an important opportunity for awareness raising for the civil society and the security sector as to what their real duties towards the population is. The fact that the politicians may in some cases still be blind as to these needs does not detract from the fact that here, as in many other countries, the population is already light years ahead of its political elites in terms of philosophical and technological development.