As a guest user you are not logged in or recognized by your IP address. You have
access to the Front Matter, Abstracts, Author Index, Subject Index and the full
text of Open Access publications.
Deterrence is an ancient strategy (as early as the 4th millennium BCE) based on defence and retaliation to prevent undesirable behaviour from a potential attacker. Specifically, deterrence—both classical and cyber-related—is based on a potential attacker perceiving an unacceptable cost and consequently refraining from attack. Similarly to nuclear deterrence, cyber-deterrence may be an effective strategy against foreign governmental attackers, who might refrain from attacking for fear of retaliation. However, cyber-deterrence may not be as effective against individual terrorist hackers or clandestine organisations that have a high propensity towards risks or simply believe they can attack with impunity. This paper outlines some solutions to the fundamental challenge of modelling deterrence in Cyberia and discusses theoretical and policy implications based on computational social science.
This website uses cookies
We use cookies to provide you with the best possible experience. They also allow us to analyze user behavior in order to constantly improve the website for you. Info about the privacy policy of IOS Press.
This website uses cookies
We use cookies to provide you with the best possible experience. They also allow us to analyze user behavior in order to constantly improve the website for you. Info about the privacy policy of IOS Press.