Safeguarding nuclear material has become paramount for international security since the end of the Cold War, and in particular since September 11, 2001. On the one hand, nuclear materials have became more readily available and accessible as a result of the Soviet collapse and the emergence of many new suppliers. On the other, the nature and intensity of the threat have changed, rendering previously existing measures to safeguard nuclear materials less adequate. The biggest threat to international security since the early 1990s has been the theft of nuclear materials by terrorists who use these materials in terror attacks. The emphasis during these early years was on quickly fixing security gaps at a large number of nuclear facilities. There was little time to develop a comprehensive strategy not only to fund, build, or install these upgrades, but also to assure that they were properly used and operated. It soon became clear that these initial strategies placed insufficient emphasis on the human factor of materials protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A). Newly installed equipment was in many cases incompatible with work practices and threat perceptions among facility personnel.

Subsequent efforts to develop an appropriate “security culture” that addresses the new security threats have produced positive results. Security culture received the high-level attention it undoubtedly deserves at the U.S.-Russian Bratislava summit in February 2005. However, most observers agree that changing security culture is not as easy as installing technical upgrades: cultures are resistant to change and develop gradually, whereas a quick response is needed. A striking cultural shift occurred in the safety-culture domain after the 1986 Chernobyl accident. Indeed, this cultural transformation took place not only on the workforce level but on the level of facility management, the national leadership, and even the general public. The accident also helped revolutionize international perspectives on and cooperation in nuclear safety, resulting in new international norms and regulations to prevent such accidents in the future. This paper examines the safety-culture shift and considers how applicable it is to the ongoing work of improving security culture at nuclear facilities worldwide.