Over the past few years, security threats to the nuclear fuel cycle have increased as a consequence of increased terrorist activities worldwide. The civilian and military nuclear industry has extensive experience in dealing with security issues. This experience is reflected in the industry's security culture, which is generally further advanced than in many other sectors of the national infrastructure in industrialized countries. The reason for this lies in its characteristics, which render the nuclear industry inherently more prone than other industries to security threats: the symbolism inherent in the nuclear industry, which is viewed as a cornerstone of modern industrialization; the physical and chemical properties of the radioactive materials handled at nuclear sites; the importance of the civilian nuclear industry to the national economy, producing up to 80 percent of total electricity in some countries; and the importance of the nuclear sector to national security in nuclear weapon states.

The increasing incidence of suicide terrorism worldwide, coupled with the increasing degree of transnational operational logistics used to plan and implement covert illicit activities, has resulted in new security risks for the nuclear fuel cycle. These new security risks cover a wide range, from the successful establishment of international networks that covertly traffic in nuclear technology and materials, to the loss of “self-protection” of radioactive materials in the case of suicide terrorism. Several such security threats have already emerged.

Therefore, it will be necessary for nuclear facility owners and operators, security agencies, and regulators to strengthen the current nuclear security culture at all levels by considering it as a dynamic process, reflecting the needs of the time. This will require a review and overhaul of the current security management system, building sufficient flexibility into the system to make it applicable to all nuclear operations for all situations, since there is no “best” approach. Key to success in countering new threats is a clear emphasis on the important role played by each of the stakeholders. Ideally, a comprehensive nuclear security culture (CNSC) system should reflect a close relationship among operators, managers, and regulators in jointly analyzing new threat scenarios, developing adequate, cost-effective countermeasures, and allowing each stakeholder to identify for himself his specific contribution to the overall goal. Four universal properties of a CNSC system are presented here, which should enable the nuclear community to adapt the current nuclear security culture to the new security risks.