This paper employs the methodology of Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE) to investigate under what conditions trust can be viable in markets. The emergence and breakdown of trust is modeled in a context of multiple buyers and suppliers. Agents adapt their trust in a partner, the weight they attach to trust relative to profitability, and their own trustworthiness, modeled as a threshold of defection. Adaptation occurs on the basis of realized profit. Trust turns out to be viable under fairly general conditions.
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