This Chapter assesses ongoing attempts to balance security and openness in the conduct of civilian bioscience and biomedical research. More specifically it examines the state of current policy discussions regarding the security threats posed by life science research results and techniques. Concern about their “dual-use” potential has intensified tremendously since 9/11 and the anthrax attacks in the U.S. Despite the considerable attention being paid to this issue today, this Chapter argues that current discussions are unclear and arguably problematic in relation to vital questions regarding the problem posed by life science research, the ultimate goals of controls, and the desirability of the circulation of dual-use knowledge. It seeks to challenge the state of discussion by asking how the current security presentations of the threats posed by emerging bioscience developments are themselves formed in relation to definitions of scientific practice. On the basis of this analysis, consideration is given to the potential and pitfalls associated with current international efforts to devise a “code of conduct” for bioscientists.