Control by partition refers to situations where an election chair seeks to influence the outcome of an election by partitioning either the candidates or the voters into two groups, thus creating two first-round subelections that determine who will take part in a final round. The model of partition-of-voters control attacks is remotely related to “gerrymandering” (maliciously resizing election districts). While the complexity of control by partition (and other control actions) has been studied thoroughly for many voting systems, there are no such results known for the important veto and maximin voting systems. We settle the complexity of control by partition for veto in a broad variety of models and for maximin with respect to destructive control by partition of candidates. We also observe that a reduction from the literature [8] showing the parameterized complexity of control by adding candidates to plurality elections, parameterized by the number of voters, is technically flawed by giving a counterexample, and we show how this reduction can be fixed.