

Introduction: NATO, Afghanistan and the Central Asian Security in the Aftermath of 9/11

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The war in Afghanistan that started in response to the horrendous terrorist attacks in the United States by the Afghanistan-based Al Qaida terrorist network on 11 September 2011 has been one of the key security challenges to international stability due to the complex nature of international terrorism and its regional as well as global implications. Central Asia is one of those regions that have been increasingly influenced by the security developments in and around Afghanistan. It is possible to observe a growing interdependence between the security developments in Afghanistan and Central Asia in various aspects of security, creating a basis for a new regional security complex.

This edited book seeks to explore the impact of the fight against international terrorism in Afghanistan on the security situation in Central Asia as well as NATO's security contributions to both Afghanistan and Central Asia through its comprehensive approach to security in this region. The scholarly analysis of this topic is very important since the impact of the developments in Afghanistan on Central Asia is likely to increase significantly after 2014 when NATO will transfer the security responsibility of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Afghan National Security forces (ANSF).

The book also aims at making a humble contribution to the existing academic literature on the relationship between Afghanistan and Central Asia as well as NATO's contributions to the regional security. There are already several very important scholarly works on the security situation in Afghanistan and NATO's role in cementing the international cooperation against Afghanistan-based international terrorism. The number of books, articles and reports on Afghanistan, which started to flourish originally in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, has proliferated considerably in the aftermath of the 9/11. The existing literature covers the history and anthropology of the Afghanistan as well as the socio-political sources of insecurity and international politics of enhancing regional security in and around Afghanistan.¹ Although this literature is quite rich in terms of the quality of scholarship and the coverage of issues concerning Afghanistan and its relations with neighbours, the constantly changing nature of the security situation in and around Afghanistan necessitates a re-examination of the changing dynamics of regional security and its regional implications, as this volume humbly endeavours to do so.

The chapters in this book assume that there is an evolving regional security complex in Central Asia, which includes Afghanistan as well as the five Central Asian states; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.² The

hegemonic regional powers; namely Russia and China together with their regional security organizations; the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) also constitute the parts of this dynamic regional security complex, characterized by intense security relations of enmity and amity.³ Besides, the developments in Afghanistan affect not only the security developments in Central Asia, but also security at the global level. Due to the growing interdependence among the local, regional and global levels of security, NATO together with the United States and its Euro-Atlantic allies in NATO, make significant contributions to the security situation not only in Afghanistan but also in Central Asia.

In fact, the instability in Afghanistan is likely to have enduring effects on Central Asian security as long as Afghanistan remained as an unstable country. Likewise, the prospects for enhancing Afghanistan's security seem to be contingent on the willingness of the Central Asian states to increase their existing level of support for the security of Afghanistan. The security interdependence between Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries stems partly from the fact that approximately one-fourth of Afghanistan's borderline is with the Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Besides, Afghanistan's historical and cultural links with Central Asia are reflected in the fact that all major nationalities in Central Asia, especially the Tajiks, the Uzbeks and the Turkmens, have their co-ethnics in the Afghan population.⁴

Historically, there had been always close relationships between the peoples of Afghanistan and Central Asia, since the Central Asian peoples of the Tajiks, the Uzbeks and the Turkmens in the Northern Afghanistan have maintained a dominant position in Afghanistan as compared to other nationalities.⁵ This relationship gained a new strategic significance when the Imperial Russia and Britain were engaged in the well-known "great game" for hegemonic dominance in this region in the nineteenth century. Although the Soviet rule in Central Asia resulted in the severing of Central Asia's connections with Afghanistan, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 marked the beginning of new era in the relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Central Asia.⁶

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 followed the rise of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan to power in Kabul through a Soviet-backed coup d'état in 1978.⁷ A decade-long civil war among the Afghans and a war between the Afghan resistance forces and the Soviet occupation forces lasted until 1989 when the Soviet Union was forced to withdraw from Afghanistan. Following the end of the Soviet support to his government, Mohammed Najibullah's rule also ended in 1992.⁸

Nevertheless, this development sowed the seeds of instability in Afghanistan in post-Cold War era, since the presidential power was transferred to Burhaneddin Rabbani representing the interests of non-Pashtun minorities in Afghanistan when the Pashtuns were internally divided between the movements led by Sibghatullah Mojaddedi and Gulbeddin Hikmetyar.⁹ This strengthened the positions of the Tajiks, the Uzbeks and the Turkmens who controlled the north of the country. Besides, the post-Soviet civil war in Tajikistan between 1992 and 1997 undermined the stability in Afghanistan even further, as the Tajiks in Afghanistan became internally divided due to their conflicting allegiances to both sides of the Tajik civil war.¹⁰

Afghanistan's internal political conflict intensified when the radical group of Islamic seminary school students, the Taliban, led by Mohammad Umar acquired power throughout Afghanistan by ousting President Burhaneddin Rabbani in 1996. The rise of Taliban established the Pashtun dominance in Afghanistan with the significant support of Pakistan. This development weakened the positions of the Central Asian

minorities in Afghanistan, leading to the establishment of an alliance among the Tajiks, the Uzbeks and the Turkmens, which is known as the 'Northern Alliance'.¹¹

The Central Asian states were also very supportive of the establishment of this anti-Taliban 'Northern Alliance' in Afghanistan. In fact, the leaders of the Central Asian minorities in Afghanistan met in Kazakhstan's city of Almaty in October 1996 in order to formalize the establishment of this alliance. With the creation of the Northern Alliance, the Central Asian states sought to establish a buffer zone between their borders and the areas that came under the Taliban control. In addition to supporting this meeting in Kazakhstan actively, Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov also proposed that six countries bordering Afghanistan; namely China, Iran, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, together with Russia and the USA could meet in a 6+2 group of 'neighbours and friends of Afghanistan' framework in 1997. This group of countries actually met at the Tashkent conference in July 1999. In this meeting, the parties identified their own key principles of the peaceful conflict settlement in Afghanistan.¹²

Gradually, the Northern Alliance and the 'neighbours and friends of Afghanistan' initiatives led to the creation of an international consensus on putting an end to the Taliban regime, which was believed to have close ties with the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and its leader, Osama bin Laden. Consequently, the United States and Russia succeeded in getting the support of the United Nations Security Council members for the Resolution 1267, which requires the Taliban to end its relations with the Al Qaida terrorist and to extradite Osama bin Laden in October 1999.¹³

Nevertheless, the Taliban's non-compliance with this UN resolution resulted in the imposition of a series of sanctions against the Taliban in November 1999. Following the Taliban's continued defiance of the UN resolution, the United Nations Security Council adopted its Resolution 1333 that enhanced the UN sanctions against the Taliban in December 2000.¹⁴ Meanwhile, the Central Asian countries became very alarmed about the instability in Afghanistan and the risk that Afghanistan could be used by international terrorist organizations in order to destabilize the whole region.¹⁵

The terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 was a turning point in the response of the international community to the growing radicalism of Taliban and its support for the Al Qaida terrorist organization which is responsible for these terrorist acts. Following the 9/11, the NATO members invoked the Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and joined the fight against international terrorism in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world.¹⁶ Likewise, the Central Asian states also condemned these terrorist attacks, and promised that they will strongly support all initiatives for fighting against these terrorists.¹⁷

In this context, the Central Asian states supported the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan by assisting the combat forces in various forms. They also supported the formation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as an originally United Nations initiative. The UN Security Council Resolution 1386 defined the main mission of the ISAF as one of assisting "the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment."¹⁸

Although the ISAF became a NATO mission in 2003, NATO assumed the responsibility for entire country only in October 2006 after getting the responsibility for several regions in successive stages.¹⁹ During the NATO's command of the ISAF, NATO has sought to enhance Afghanistan's security by using both civilian as well as

military instruments. In addition to combating the terrorists which use violence against the Afghan people and the security forces, NATO also pursues a disarmament strategy towards those moderate Taliban units which abandoned violence through non-military and political measures. Likewise, NATO and its members make significant contributions to the socio-economic and political reconstruction of Afghanistan through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) throughout the country.²⁰

Given the huge magnitude of the task of stabilizing and reconstructing Afghanistan, it has always been very important for NATO to maintain the support of the Central Asian states together with other neighbours of Afghanistan, for its first out of area operation, with around 350,000 personnel from the NATO member and non-member countries. In fact, NATO's presence in Afghanistan reflects the transformation of NATO from a collective defence organization in the North Atlantic Area to a global security provider which started to deal with the emerging soft security threats, above all the fight against international terrorism, in addition to the traditional hard security issues.²¹

In order to sustain the initial support of the Central Asian countries, the Prague North Atlantic Council meeting on 21 November 2002 agreed to develop new instruments in the Partnership for Peace Programs such as Individual Partnership Action Plans. In this way, NATO members sought to develop a more comprehensive and differentiated approach to the needs of the partner countries in Central Asia to maintain their support for combating terrorism as well as reforming their military structures in harmony with the NATO standards.²²

NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer explained the importance of engaging the Central Asian states in the fight against international terrorism as follows: "We need Central Asian nations to play an important role in supporting the ISAF operation because we need the lines of communication – to say in military terms – and transit agreements with the Central Asians, to see that what can adequately run the ISAF operation in Afghanistan".²³

For NATO, it was also crucial to develop a closer relationship with the Central Asian countries in order to secure a reliable transportation corridor for NATO countries in providing logistical supplies to their forces in Afghanistan. There were mainly two distribution networks available for NATO to send logistical supplies to Afghanistan: The supply route passing through Pakistan is labelled as the Southern Distribution Network (SDN) and the supply route passing through Central Asia is known as Northern Distribution Network (NDN).²⁴

The Central Asian states cooperated with NATO in the creation of Northern Distribution Network (NDN). All of the Central Asian countries signed various transit agreements with NATO in order to support the ISAF and the Operation Enduring Freedom military operations in Afghanistan. Besides, they also provided NATO with temporary military bases to be used for the NATO operations in Afghanistan. In fact, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan provided the NATO member countries with two strategically very important military bases as part of their support to the NATO mission in Afghanistan.²⁵

In this way, the Central Asian countries have increased their strategic value in the eyes of the NATO members following NATO's 2004 Istanbul Summit, which specifically emphasized the development of NATO's relations with the Central Asian states through the following NATO programs: Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB), Planning and Review Process (PARP) and Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism (PAP-T).²⁶

NATO institutionalized its new interest in developing relations with the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program countries in Central Asia by appointing a special representative and a liaison officer responsible for coordinating NATO's relations with these Central Asian states. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer appointed Robert F. Simmons as NATO's Special Representative for Central Asia and the Caucasus responsible for enhancing NATO's dialogue with the Central Asian states in September 2004.²⁷ Likewise, Tugay Tuncer was also appointed as NATO's liaison officer to be responsible for NATO's communication and cooperation with the Central Asian states. Although NATO's Liaison Office for Central Asia is based in Kazakhstan, the liaison officer was responsible for coordinating NATO's relations with all Central Asian states.²⁸

NATO developed its relations with the Central Asian states at various levels. Among the five of Central Asian countries, Turkmenistan is the only neutral state, preventing it from developing closer relations with any military alliance, including NATO. Despite its 'permanent neutrality state' status, Ashgabad coordinated its policy towards Afghanistan very closely with NATO. An Individual Partnership Cooperation Programme defines the scope of NATO's cooperation with Turkmenistan. In this framework, Ashgabad has been largely accommodative towards the requests of NATO and its members concerning the ISAF mission in Afghanistan since 2003.²⁹

Although Tajikistan is the most important Central Asian country for the security of Afghanistan, under heavy Russian pressure, Dushanbe has been very reserved in developing its security cooperation with NATO and its members. Nevertheless, Tajikistan signed several agreements with both the US and France in order to enable their air forces to use its airspace as well as airfields. Tajikistan established a formal relationship with NATO only in 2002 when Dushanbe signed the Partnership for Peace agreement with NATO.³⁰

In Central Asia, Uzbekistan has been one of the most active supporters of the fight against international terrorism in Afghanistan since the mid-1990s. Accordingly, Uzbekistan gave the US and its NATO allies the right to use Uzbekistan's territory and air space to give the logistical support to their troops in Afghanistan as well as the right to use Uzbekistan's air bases in order to station their forces and military equipment.³¹ Nevertheless, the Andijan uprising and Tashkent's disproportionate use of force in suppressing this uprising in May 2005 attracted major criticisms from the United States and its NATO allies. Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov responded to NATO's call for an independent inquiry by supporting the resolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2005 Astana Summit that asked the US and its NATO allies to withdraw from the military base in Uzbekistan. Besides, Tashkent also denied the US and its NATO allies the right to use Uzbekistan as a transit route to Afghanistan starting from 2006.³²

As a NATO PfP country, Kyrgyzstan has been also supporting the fight against international terrorism since immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States.³³ Accordingly, Bishkek gave the US and some of its NATO allies, the right to use the Manas airport as a military base for the deployment of up to 5,000 soldiers. Nevertheless, the Manas base is not a permanent US military base since Washington and Bishkek agreed that the right to use the Manas airbase could be renewed every year until the end of the fight against terrorism in and around Afghanistan.³⁴

The last but not least of the Central Asian countries that clearly supported the fight against international terrorism is Kazakhstan, which gave the United States and its NATO allies the right to supply humanitarian aid to their troops in Afghanistan and

the over-flight rights to the NATO aircrafts. Kazakhstan is also the only country in Central Asia that upgraded its level of partnership with NATO to the level of Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). Kazakhstan also hosts NATO's Liaison Office for Central Asia, which is responsible for coordinating NATO's relations with the Central Asian countries.³⁵

Although the Central Asian states seem quite supportive of both the fight against international terrorism in Afghanistan, and containing the destabilizing impact of Afghanistan on the security situation in Central Asia, there is no consensus among them concerning their threat perceptions, the characterization of security problems, the regional approach to security and the further development of relations with NATO in addition to other regional security organizations. Therefore, there is a need for more research into various aspects of Afghanistan's impact on the security situation in Central Asia and the evolving relationship between NATO and the Central Asian states.

In fact, there is no significant Central Asian regional ownership of the policy towards the security situation in Afghanistan. The Central Asian states simply wish that their own region remains stable and insulated from the developments in Afghanistan. The leaderships do not come to terms with the realities of Afghanistan even if there are many people with the Central Asian ethnic background in Afghanistan. Considering that the stability of Central Asian political regimes is closely linked to the developments in Afghanistan, the Central Asian governments need to increase their contributions and engagement in the security of Afghanistan.³⁶

Clearly, Afghanistan seems to be dependent on the continuous support of both its neighbours and NATO for its own security. In fact, ISAF developed a "strategic vision" for rebuilding Afghanistan in NATO's 2008 Bucharest Summit.³⁷ This vision includes the following four priorities: First, NATO has a long-term commitment to Afghanistan's security. Second, NATO seeks the Afghan leadership to assume greater responsibility in Afghanistan. Third, NATO aims at bringing together civilian and military efforts of the international community through a comprehensive approach. The last but not least priority is to increase cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan's neighbours.³⁸

During NATO's 2010 Lisbon summit, all of the NATO members declared that they will remain committed to Afghanistan's security. NATO's 2010 Lisbon Summit labelled Afghanistan as NATO's key partner and emphasized the global nature of the security problem in Afghanistan since what happens in this country also affects the security of NATO's Euro-Atlantic area as well as global security.³⁹ Accordingly, in addition to Afghanistan's "strategic partnership" agreement with the US, signed in May 2012, Afghanistan became a "major non-NATO ally" of the US entitling Kabul to greater US military assistance after the withdrawal of NATO.⁴⁰

Likewise, NATO's 2012 Chicago Summit in May 2012 reinforced the commitment of NATO members to Afghanistan even further. Besides, NATO's 2012 Chicago Summit adopted NATO's transition strategy for Afghanistan after 2014 when the Afghan security forces will assume a leading role in Afghanistan's security while NATO will play a supporting role with its smaller number of forces.⁴¹ NATO's process of transition of security responsibility from ISAF to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) explained by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen as follows: "Afghan authorities take the lead, and we move into a supportive role. But it doesn't mean a rush for the exit."⁴²

In fact, this transition process is likely to be very challenging. To begin with, Afghanistan's neighbours, including the Central Asian countries should be very

supportive of the transition process through increasing their contributions to the “regional solutions” to the security challenges. To this purpose, Afghanistan’s neighbours need to resolve their differences and to contribute to Afghanistan’s security more actively since the ongoing instability and a potential vacuum of power in Afghanistan could potentially harm their interests even more after 2014.

Secondly, NATO needs to establish a broad consensus in Afghanistan through building up political power through a bottom-up rather than top-down approach. Although it is easier for NATO and other members of international community to work with the central authorities, it is also important that Kabul’s authority needs to be supported by the provinces. To this purpose, NATO needs to help the Afghan authorities to decentralize political power by accommodating moderate tribal leaders in the provinces without strengthening the position of the radical segments of Taliban.

Thirdly, the main challenge to NATO’s post-2014 strategy stems from the concerns over the military capability and financial sustainability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which is expected to develop the military capabilities of the existing approximately 350,000 NATO soldiers. Besides, it will take more time for NATO to train an adequate number of the ANSF.⁴³ In addition, NATO also needs to enhance the level of coordination between NATO and the ANSF units. At present, the ANSF units are not always very cooperative. Even some ANSF units are involved in the attacks against NATO forces in Afghanistan. It is very important to select the ANSF trainees carefully and to remove those radicals from the ANSF until 2014.⁴⁴

Likewise, it is very challenging to sustain the security forces in Afghanistan financially. The Afghan economy is not based on domestic production, which could constitute a reliable tax base for the Afghan government. In order to meet the financial and budgetary challenges of the very expensive security operations, the Afghan government is likely to remain dependent on external financial aid in the foreseeable future.⁴⁵ In fact, it is estimated that international community should donate the ANSF 4 billion USD annually. This is also very likely to cause a problem of burden sharing among the NATO members which suffer from global financial crisis and domestic political pressures for decreasing their financial and troop contributions to Afghanistan. Although more than 60 donor countries have already pledged to give economic and financial assistance to Afghanistan until 2016, they made this assistance conditional on the improvement of good governance, an effective combat against corruption as well as the holding of free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2015. Since the local realities are not likely to meet the expectations of the donor countries, there is no sustainable framework for financial assistance to Afghanistan yet.⁴⁶

Given these security challenges in and around Afghanistan, the volume as whole seeks to answer the following key questions concerning the security situation in Afghanistan and Central Asia, together with NATO’s roles in the fight against international terrorism and in enhancing regional security in the aftermath of 9/11: At the outset, it is important to address the questions concerning the challenges faced by NATO in realizing its mission in Afghanistan successfully. In this respect, this book deals with the following questions: What are the key challenges facing NATO and its emerging role in the security of Afghanistan and the neighbouring Central Asia? How could NATO enhance its existing cooperation with the Central Asian states and other regional security organizations? What are the implications of NATO’s increasing dependence on the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) for NATO’s performance in Afghanistan and its partnership relations with the Central Asian countries, especially

after 2014 when NATO will transfer the leading role in enhancing Afghanistan's security to the Afghan security forces?

Although Central Asian states are not exposed to major hard security challenges related to Afghanistan, this region is clearly vulnerable to the emerging soft security threats emanating from Afghanistan. This necessitates dealing with the following questions: Is Afghanistan a part of the regional security complex in Central Asia? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Central Asian countries in the fight against organized crime and international terrorism? How do the Central Asian countries frame the sources of insecurity in a way that serve to consolidate their regimes? How could the Central Asian states work together in dealing with illegal trafficking in their borders with Afghanistan despite their rampant corruption problem?

Energy security is a very important dimension of regional security in Central Asia which is closely linked to the security developments in Afghanistan. In this respect, the book deals with the following questions: What are the characteristics of energy security of the Central Asian countries? Does energy security of the Central Asian region mean contradictory things for the European and Asian energy consumers? What is the relevance of the rivalries over the water resources, the hydro-electrical dam projects, the energy supply routes and the protection of the pipeline infrastructures for the security of Central Asia?

There are also important questions concerning the great power politics over Central Asia, since the great powers do not agree on a single security strategy for Afghanistan and Central Asia. In fact, local, regional and global actors compete for their own strategies, creating a vacuum of power in and around Afghanistan. Could this vacuum of power in Afghanistan be filled exclusively by the contributions of the Central Asian neighbours of Afghanistan and the regional hegemonic actors such as Russia and China? What are the implications of the security vacuum in and around Afghanistan for Iran's hegemonic ambitions and its increasingly threatening nuclear strategy? How could the global actors, such as the United States and the European Union contribute to the peace and security in and around Afghanistan? Could the medium-sized soft powers like Turkey make significant contribution to regional security through their contributions in socio-economic and cultural fields?

Lastly, the book also addresses the significant questions concerning the relations among the major regional security organizations. In fact, in addition to NATO, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) pursue their own security policies in this region. It is very important to search for answers to the following questions: How do these regional security organizations approach the security of Afghanistan and Central Asia? What are the possibilities for enhancing the dialogue among these regional security organizations? Is there a possibility for a convergence in the security policies of CSTO and SCO with that of NATO?

The book is divided into five parts in order to address these questions systematically. The first part focuses on the importance of NATO's contributions to Afghanistan's security situation in the aftermath of 9/11. The second part of the book concentrates on the responses of the Central Asian states to the political instability, organized crime and international terrorism in Afghanistan. Afterwards, the book will discuss energy security in and around Central Asia and its relevance to Afghanistan. In the penultimate part, the book examines the great power politics in this region by discussing the policies of major actors such as the United States and Russia as well as medium-sized countries like Turkey towards Afghanistan and Central Asia. The final

part of the book deals with the role of various regional security organizations, such as NATO, CSTO and SCO in the fight against international terrorism in Afghanistan.

In the first part of the book, which is entitled as “NATO Contribution to Lasting Security in Afghanistan”, *Daniele Riggio*, who is an Information Officer for Afghanistan, Central Asian Republics, Iraq, and Mongolia at NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division in Brussels-Belgium, analyzes NATO’s contributions to the security of Afghanistan in his paper entitled as “NATO Support to the Afghan Stabilization Process: An Evolving Mission for a Long-Term Commitment”.

In his chapter, Riggio clearly identifies the key contributions of NATO to Afghanistan’s security in the fields of governance, human rights, and socio- economic development of Afghanistan in addition to the provision of security. According to Riggio, NATO has been quite successful in using both civilian and military instruments to achieve its ultimate goal of creating a self-sustainable Afghan governance in enhancing Afghanistan’s security. Riggio argues that NATO employs a unique fully-fledged counter-insurgency model of international assistance, which largely contained the insurgents and enabled the Afghan National Security Forces to develop both in numbers and capabilities.

Based on his analysis of the Lisbon and Chicago Summits of NATO in 2010 and 2012 respectively, Riggio concludes that NATO will develop a sustainable framework for the smooth transition strategy. According to Riggio, NATO has already developed a consensus among its members concerning the smooth transfer of ISAF responsibilities to ANSF.

In the second part of the book, which is entitled as “Responses of the Central Asian States to Political Instability, Organized Crime and International Terrorism in Afghanistan”, the authors explore the way in which the Central Asian countries have coped with Afghanistan’s political instability, organized crime as well as the Afghanistan-based international terrorism. Although the Central Asian states have not experienced any hard security threat from Afghanistan and other neighbours, these soft security challenges have created new security risks and opportunities for the Central Asian states and societies. This part focuses on the domestic and foreign policy implication of the Central Asian survival strategies.

The first chapter of the second part of the book is authored by *Kamer Kasim*, who is both the Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences at Abant Izzet Baysal University and the Vice-President of International Strategic Research Organization in Turkey. Kamer Kasim’s chapter, which is entitled as “Central Asian Neighbours and the 3 R Process in Afghanistan”, examines the characteristics of counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan that emphasizes the reconciliation with the moderate elements of the Taliban that laid down their weapons and their reintegration into the Afghan society during the political reconstruction of post-Taliban Afghanistan. This chapter notes that the Central Asian neighbours of Afghanistan have been largely confused by the adoption of this counter-insurgency strategy as they feared that this might lead to the revival of Taliban’s power in Afghanistan. This paper also explores the sources and the implications of the Central Asian responses to the 3 R process. The Central Asian countries have considered the accommodation of moderate Taliban units very cautiously due to its impact on the viability of post-Taliban Afghan government and the relative power of the Central Asian communities in Northern Afghanistan vis-à-vis the predominantly Pashtun Taliban units.

Medet Tiulegenov, who is a Lecturer at the International and Comparative Politics Department of American University of Central Asia in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, explores

regional connectedness of political contentions in Central Asia and Afghanistan in his paper entitled as “Political Contentions in Central Asia and Afghanistan: Regional Dis/Connectedness”. Tiulegenov explores the level of connectedness among the Central Asian countries by examining the fields of economic, social and information as well as political volatility in each of the Central Asian countries. Employing the concepts of resource mobilization, opportunity structures and framing, Tiulegenov notes that political contentions in Central Asia developed cross-border consequences mostly through external rather than diffusion effects.

Akmaljon Abdullayev, who is from the University of World Economy and Diplomacy under Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tashkent, discusses the effectiveness of the Central Asian countries in stopping the Afghanistan-originated illicit drug trafficking in his paper entitled as “Securitization Prospects of Illicit Drug Trafficking in Central Asia”. Abdullayev claims that although the illicit drug trafficking has been very threatening to the security of the post-Soviet states in Central Asia, the Central Asian governments have not yet considered the illicit drug trafficking as a key security issue for themselves. According to Abdullayev, this is evident in the lack of a regionally-agreed discourse on the significance of the fight against the Afghanistan-originated illicit drug trafficking. This is partly due to, for Abdullayev, the differences in the way that the Central Asian states describe the threat posed by illicit drug trafficking to their own security. Abdullayev recommends that the Central Asian states should take more effective anti-corruption measures to keep the Afghanistan-originated illicit drug trafficking under control. In fact, the rampant corruption problem in the border management authorities of the Central Asian states undermines their effectiveness in stopping the Afghanistan-originated illicit drug trafficking.

Bakyt Borkoev, who is an Associate Professor at the Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, contributed to this volume with his paper entitled as “The Problem of Terrorism in Central Asia and Countering Terrorist Activities in Kyrgyzstan”. In this paper, Borkoev explores the regional sources of terrorism and the possible counter-terrorism measures in Central Asia through the prism of Kyrgyzstan. Borkoev underlines the impact of Afghanistan as well as the domestic factors in Central Asia, such as the weakness of socio-political institutions, the crisis of ideology and the problems of the legal system as the main sources of terrorism. Borkoev also analyzes the legal aspects of Kyrgyzstan’s counter-terrorism measures as an example of the Central Asian responses to the threat of terrorism. Borkoev concludes his chapter by discussing the effectiveness of the regional security organizations such as CSTO and SCO in countering the Afghanistan- originated terrorism in Central Asia.

This part concludes with a chapter by *Zhamgyrbek Bokoshev*, who is a Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at Kyrgyzstan-Turkey Manas University in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. In his paper entitled as “Impact of Afghanistan on Kyrgyzstan’s Security”, Bokoshev discusses the direct and indirect mechanisms through which the insecurity in Afghanistan breeds terrorism and a number of other soft security problems for Kyrgyzstan. According to Bokoshev, the illicit drug trafficking and the infiltration of the international terrorist groups from Afghanistan into Kyrgyzstan create significant security problems for Bishkek. For Bokoshev, Kyrgyzstan’s socio-political stability and its international cooperation against terrorism and extremism as well as Afghanistan’s socio-economic recovery constitute the three main factors which could enhance Kyrgyzstan’s security.

In the third part of the volume, which is entitled as “Energy Security in and around Central Asia”, all papers underline the importance of the developments in this region

for international energy security. In fact, energy security has already become very important for the stability of the Central Asian countries since the current rivalries over the control of energy resources and the pipelines in the region make the already complex security situation even more complicated. In order to avoid the destabilizing effects of the energy policies of the Central Asian states, it is very important to develop international networks of cooperation among the regional states and global markets in such a way that could channel the benefits of energy production to regional development projects. Besides, it is equally important to address the energy needs of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan which are poor in hydro-carbon reserves, since they may tend to construct new hydro-electrical dams over the trans-boundary rivers, creating new environmental problems in the region.

Sergiy Korsunsky, who is the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Turkey since 2008, authors the first chapter of this part which is entitled as “NATO and the Energy Security of the Caspian and the Black Sea Regions”. In this chapter, Korsunsky explores the evolution of NATO’s role in enhancing energy security of its members and various pipeline projects which could reduce dependence of the European members of NATO on energy supplies from Russia. Korsunsky identifies Russia’s energy policy as a main challenge to the European energy security, as conceived by the EU and NATO. According to Korsunsky, a closer integration of Turkey and Ukraine into the European energy strategy would contribute to the energy security of these countries as well as NATO and EU.

Ardak Yesdauletova, who is an Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations of the Eurasian National University in Astana, Kazakhstan, explores the aspects of energy security for the Central Asian states. In her paper entitled as “Energy Security and Its Impact on the Domestic and Foreign Policies of the Central Asian Countries”, Yesdauletova discusses the domestic and regional dimensions of energy security for the Central Asian states, which have unequal shares in the regional energy resources of oil, natural gas as well as water. According to Yesdauletova, the security situation in Afghanistan affects the Central Asian energy security strategies as well. Yesdauletova argues that the Central Asian states could play a crucial role in enhancing the energy security of Afghanistan and themselves through realizing the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline project as well as the Central Asia - South Asia electricity scheme (CASA) project. She also thinks that the support of the Central Asian countries for NATO’s Northern Distribution Network (NDN) is crucial for their own energy security too.

Zaur Shiriyev who is a research fellow at the Foreign Policy Analysis Department of the Center for Strategic Studies in Baku, Azerbaijan, makes another very important contribution to the discussions on energy security with his paper entitled as “Impact of Afghanistan on Energy Security in the Caspian Sea Basin: The Role of Azerbaijan”. In his paper, Shiriyev analyzes Afghanistan’s impact on the energy security in the Caspian Sea basin by exploring Azerbaijan’s policies in the aftermath of 9/11. He also discusses Azerbaijan’s foreign policy in terms of its implications for Baku’s security, energy and economic policies. Shiriyev identifies 9/11 and the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 as two main turning points for the security situation in the Caspian Sea basin. Shiriyev argues that Azerbaijan’s commitments to Afghanistan’s security and its own energy projects oriented towards Europe could strengthen the existing partnership between the United States and Azerbaijan.

The penultimate part of the book is entitled as “International Competition and Co-operation over Afghanistan and Central Asia”. The international political aspect of the

security in Afghanistan and Central Asia is particularly very important since the emerging regional security complex in Central Asia creates incentives for both great power competition and cooperation. Afghanistan has become a key issue for all major international and regional powers.

The first article of this part is authored by a well-known expert on Russia, *Peter J. S. Duncan* who is a Senior Lecturer at the University College London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies in London, United Kingdom. In this article, which is entitled as “Russia, NATO and the ‘War on Terror’: Competition and Co-operation in Central Asia after 11 September 2001”, Duncan explores the impact of Russia’s cooperation with NATO in Afghanistan on the regional security in Central Asia. He argues that this relationship is not a zero-sum game since both sides have shared interests in furthering their cooperation in the ‘war on terror’. According to Duncan, Russia supports the fight against international terrorism because it makes Russia’s southern borders more secure so that Moscow could focus on the security of other areas. Thus, for Duncan, the increasing US influence in Central Asia in the aftermath of 9/11 has not undermined Russia’s security hegemony in Central Asia yet since Moscow keeps intensifying its security cooperation with China and the Central Asian states.

Zakir Chotaev, who is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of International Relations of the Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, make a significant contribution to the international political aspect of the security in Afghanistan and Central Asia through his article entitled as ‘The Great Powers in Central Asia: Policies of the US and Russia’. Chotaev explores the foreign policies of Washington and Moscow towards Central Asia, and the implications of their competition for the Central Asian countries. Chotaev argues that although the contributions of the United States and Russia to the security of Central Asia had mainly positive effects for the Central Asian states, the periodic deterioration in their bilateral relations intensifies their regional competition and destabilizes the whole region. In his paper, Chotaev discerns three periods of regional competition between Washington and Moscow: During the first period between 2001 and 2006, the United States gained a dominant regional position. The second period between 2006 and 2009 was characterized by Russia’s challenge to the dominant position of the United States by reasserting its influence throughout Central Asia. During the latest period between 2009 and the present both powers succeeded in balancing each other without undermining the regional stability.

In my chapter entitled as “Turkey’s Evolving Role in the Security of Afghanistan and Central Asia since 9/11: Sources and Limitations of Ankara’s Soft Power”, I sought to analyze Turkey’s evolving role in the security of Afghanistan and Central Asia since 2001. In this chapter, I also compare and contrast Turkey’s security policy towards this region before and after 9/11. Relying on this comparative analysis, I point out that unlike the period before 2001 when Turkey’s security policy towards Afghanistan and Central Asia had been guided by its ambitious and unrealistic desire of becoming a hegemonic power of the region, replacing Russia its security policy in the aftermath of 9/11 reflects its emerging globalist outlook that stresses the significance of international cooperation in eradicating the root causes of international terrorism as well as the use of soft power in economic and cultural fields in order to promote socio-economic and political reconstruction of Afghanistan. The paper argues that Turkey’s soft power has significant limitations due to its lack of a comprehensive strategy towards the region, the ups and downs in coordinating its policies with its NATO allies as well as the widening gap between its ends and means. In this paper, it is also noted

that Turkey's engagement in the security of Afghanistan and Central Asia is very likely to continue even after the successful realization of NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan in 2014.

The final part of the book which is entitled as "Regional Security Organizations and the Fight against International Terrorism in Afghanistan" explores the emerging web of relations among the regional security organizations and its impact on the fight against international terrorism in Central Asia. In fact, the fight against international terrorism has necessitated a greater level of global and regional cooperation. In this context, it is very important to examine to what extent the active regional security organizations in Central Asia, such as Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are ready to increase their level of dialogue and cooperation with NATO.

In this part, *Shirin Akiner*, who is a leading expert on Central Asian studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, United Kingdom, makes a very interesting contribution with her paper entitled as "Regional Initiatives to Promote Stability and Development in Afghanistan". In her paper, Akiner explores the ways in which Afghanistan, which was once isolated from its neighbours, has been interacting with its neighbourhood since 9/11. Afghanistan cooperates closely with regional organizations of the Economic Cooperation Organisation, the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation, the South-Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia as well as United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Nevertheless, according to Akiner, there is not a single regional strategy over which Kabul and its regional partners have developed consensus. Akiner's paper notes that the regional security problems cannot be solved exclusively by military means since the fight against terrorism and other sources of instability necessitate a comprehensive strategy that utilizes civilian and military instruments for Afghanistan's development and regional re-integration. As Akiner argues, the Central Asian states have refrained from getting directly involved in the Afghan conflict through balancing major powers in order to remain unaligned.

Nika Chitadze, who is a professor of the International Black Sea University in Georgia, explores the evolution of NATO's role in the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan since the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 in his paper entitled as "NATO and International Cooperation in the Fight against Terrorism in Afghanistan". Chitadze observes that despite the high level of international cooperation, insurgency still destabilizes Afghanistan. According to Chitadze, NATO and its partners should continue to strengthen the military capabilities of the Afghan national security forces through training, equipping and financing them. Besides, for the success of NATO's strategy, NATO should also keep supporting the Afghan government to develop its state structures in both Kabul and the regions.

Alexey Fenenko, who is a Leading Research Fellow at the Institute of International Security Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow, Russia, focuses on NATO's relations with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in his paper entitled as "Prospects for the Cooperation between the CSTO and NATO after the End of the 'War on Terror' in Afghanistan". In his paper, Fenenko argues that the fight against transnational terrorism in Afghanistan and the stability of Central Asia constitute the common interests of both NATO and CSTO. In fact, for Fenenko, Russia's perception of the threat from Al Qaeda and Taliban convinced Moscow to give its consent to NATO's role in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Nevertheless,

Fenenko believes that there has been a growing mistrust between NATO and CSTO since 2009. According to Fenenko, the establishment of formal channels of dialogue between these security organizations could eliminate the sources of mistrust and promote their cooperation in Central Asia and Afghanistan further.

Khurshed Rahimov, who is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science of Tajikistan's Academy of Science in Dushanbe, makes the final contribution to this volume with his chapter entitled as "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Fight against Terrorism in and around Central Asia". Rahimov notes that Afghanistan has been surrounded by three of member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO); namely, China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and two SCO observer states; namely Pakistan and Iran. This makes SCO's relations with both Afghanistan and NATO very important for the security situation in and around Afghanistan. Rahimov argues that although the SCO adopted several decisions on countering terrorism and Afghanistan's security, and created structures like Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS) since its establishment in 2001, it has not actually contributed to regional security in a meaningful way due to its internal weaknesses. Rahimov concludes that the SCO should cooperate with NATO more on Afghanistan and Central Asia since they have common interest in enhancing regional security.

To conclude, all papers in this book share the opinion that in order to grasp the complex nature of security situation in Afghanistan and its implications for Central Asia as well as NATO's evolving role in regional security, it would be very useful to employ a comprehensive concept of security, covering its military and non-military aspects. In addition, security situations in Afghanistan and Central Asia are getting more interdependent. This makes Afghanistan increasingly a part of the regional security complex in Central Asia. Accordingly, the regional countries and security organizations need to increase their contributions to the reconstruction of Afghanistan and cooperation with NATO. Likewise, the process of democratization and socio-economic development through the adoption of viable energy security strategies could enhance both regional security and human security in Central Asia. Above all, a greater international coordination among regional and global powers such as Russia, China and the United States as well as security organizations, such as CSTO, SCO and NATO is also necessary to contain the great power rivalries and to promote common security interests in this region. Last but not least, the on-going instability in the Pashtun-populated areas of Pakistan renders the Southern Distribution Network (SDN) more unreliable, making the security of Central Asia more important to the reliability of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) which is likely to be the main supply route even after the end of ISAF mission in 2014. Last but not least, NATO and its members have a vital interest in enhancing their relations with both peoples and states of Central Asia as well as the other regional security organizations in order to enhance NATO's role in the security of Afghanistan and Central Asia.

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