In the context of mobile terminal customization, this study develops a Stackelberg model for a telecom supply chain (TSC) that includes a handset manufacturer, a telecom operator, and strategic consumers. The model is analyzed under both integrated and decentralized scenarios, focusing on dynamic pricing, demand over two cycles, and corresponding profits. The study identifies the reasons for the TSC’s performance loss and proposes a revenue sharing contract mechanism to achieve coordination within the TSC. The findings indicate that an increase in the proportion of communication service utility (PCSU) leads to a higher wholesale price and lower retail prices, which is advantageous for the handset manufacturer but may not be beneficial for the telecom operator. In the decentralized scenario, the first cycle demand remains unchanged, yet the first cycle profit is higher, and the overall two cycles profit is lower compared to the integrated scenario. Enhancing PCSU can mitigate strategic consumer behavior, but it also exacerbates the gap between supply chain profits in two scenarios. Under certain conditions, the revenue sharing contract can achieve perfect coordination within the TSC.