Science has always faced the problem of consciousness. Nevertheless, consciousness differs radically from the ordinary objects researched by science: not only because of the complexity of the neural infrastructures which are at its base or because of the subtle connections between these infrastructures and phenomena such as decision making, morals and artistic creativity, but above all because of that which gives life to the qualitative dimension and to the subjectivity of its states. If it is true that consciousness is caused by specific neuronal processes and, therefore, conscious states are causally reducible to neurobiological processes, it is also true that conscious states exist at a higher level than a few bundles of neurons. For this reason it is necessary not only to go beyond a hierarchical idea of levels of consciousness, but also to refute the idea according to which the ‘mental’ sphere is qualitative, subjective, and in the ‘first person’, while the ‘physical’ sphere is quantitative, objective and in the ‘third person’.