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Proposals for strategies for dialogical argumentation often focus on situations where one of the agents wins the dialogue and the other agent loses. Yet in real-world argumentation, it is common for agents to not involve such zero-sum situations. Rather, the agents may enter into a dialogue with divergent but not necessarily opposing views on what is important in the outcomes from the argumentation. In order to model this kind of situation, we investigate a decision-theoretic approach that allows different participants to have different utility evaluations of a dialogue, and for the proponent to model the opponent's utility evaluation in order to optimize the choice of move in the dialogue.
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