As a guest user you are not logged in or recognized by your IP address. You have
access to the Front Matter, Abstracts, Author Index, Subject Index and the full
text of Open Access publications.
It has been argued that human sociality has an intrinsically normative grammar: not only do norms guide our own behaviour, we have normative expectations concerning the way others behave, including how they take and treat us. These expectations shape our experiences concerning the social world. This paper explores three theses: 1) The normative grammar need not be a matter of “commitments”. 2) While we need to operate in the “intentional stance” in interaction with robots, to implement a fully “personifying” stance would be a category mistake. Social robots form a new category, new vaguely demarcated “social grammar”, with genuine normative expectations and experiences. Rewarding experiences caused by responses from robots need not be deceptive, although taking a fully “personifying stance” would be deceptive: the dichotomy between full persons and mere things is too coarse. 3) Recognition from others is central in the social basis of self-esteem. Feedback from robots is an interesting combination of objective non-social feedback and some kind of simulated recognition: robots can send real recognitive messages even when they themselves are not recognizers.
This website uses cookies
We use cookies to provide you with the best possible experience. They also allow us to analyze user behavior in order to constantly improve the website for you. Info about the privacy policy of IOS Press.
This website uses cookies
We use cookies to provide you with the best possible experience. They also allow us to analyze user behavior in order to constantly improve the website for you. Info about the privacy policy of IOS Press.