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In order to investigate whether robots, or, more generally, artificial systems, can have emotions, I will shed a light on Giovanna Colombetti's enactive theory of emotions because the idea of an enactive approach, especially the role it grants biology, seems to be conflicting with the idea of emotional artificial systems. I will take a look at some points of contact between the enactive approach to emotions and its interest regarding artificial systems, first and foremost the enactive notions of autonomy and “sense-making”. In what way may these concepts be realized in artificial systems as well? This will entail the question of what living systems are and what distinguishes from an artificial system, in general but especially regarding to their emotions. Having analyzed these concepts, is there any case left in which we can speak of genuine emotions of an artificial system? If not, what kind of emotions may artificial systems then have?
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