This chapter is divided into two sections: the implementation of more effective punishments for smugglers of nuclear materials and the sharing of sensitive nuclear security information to the public. In the first section Leonard Spector focuses on enhancing penalties for both state and non-state smugglers of nuclear materials. Spector presents three general categories of nuclear smuggling and provides recent examples, challenges to punishment, and suggested mitigation strategies for each. The first category is fissile material and nuclear-specific commodities transferred by states, for which Spector suggests sanctions, interdictions, and increased safeguards as viable solutions. The second category is fissile material covertly transferred by non-state actors, for which Spector sees offshore interdiction as the preferred mitigation technique. The third and final category is nuclear-specific and dual-use items covertly transferred by non-state actors. Because prosecutions in this category have proved difficult in the past, Spector recommends several alternative solutions to be used in conjunction with the methods already in place. In the second section, Beat Wieland offers a solution to the problem of balancing confidentiality and transparency with respect to nuclear security information. Because of the new challenges to confidentiality brought on by the Internet and more aggressive journalism, it is essential to have a well-prepared information-handling concept before an emergency occurs. Wieland advises that tactful handling of sensitive information is key to preventing a security emergency from developing into an information emergency.