Since terrorism is a global issue, counter-terrorism studies are also a global issue which requires cooperation and collaboration of multi-dimensional groups such as academicians representing the theoretical and research part, policymakers representing the coordination and authorization part and professionals representing the practical and real life experience. This publication is unique because it includes the researches, experiences and perceptions of all parts of this cooperation and collaboration. Hence, there are four primary sections in this book elaborating their perspectives: Understanding Terrorism, Suicide Attacks, Radical terrorism and Case Studies, Strategies and Tactics for Dealing with Terrorist Hostage Sieges, Hijackings and Kidnappings, and Counter-Terrorism Policies: Lessons for the Future. This book encapsulates these various themes that highlight how to understand the terrorism phenomenon and analyze how to respond to terrorism and terrorist operations and how to promote counter terrorism policies and strategies.
Suleyman Hancerli and Ozgur Nikbay, who are members of the Turkish National Police (TNP) and Turkish Institute for Police Studies (TIPS), have developed two new projects titled “Understanding and Responding to Terrorism Motivated Hostage and Kidnap Situations” and “Understanding and Responding to Suicide Attacks” and have submitted the proposals to NATO Headquarters in November, 2005. NATO has granted their two proposals and combined them under the Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) under the title “Terrorist Operations.” In addition to NATO, this combined ARW was sponsored by the TNP, the University of North Texas, the Center on Terrorism at John Jay College, the Rutgers School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University, Roger Williams University, the TIPS, and the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center at American University.
In addition to the ARW of the Terrorist Operations directed by Suleyman Hancerli and Ozgur Nikbay, NATO Headquarters funded two additional projects (1) “ARW of the Policing Responses to Terrorist Operations” directed by fellow TNP members Bilal Sevinc, Huseyin Durmaz, Ahmet S. Yayla, and Siddik Ekici, and (2) “ARW of the Sociological Approach to Terrorism” directed by TNP members Suleyman Ozeren and Ismail D. Gunes. The three projects together culminated in the convening the “Conference of Understanding and Responding to Terrorism: A Multi-dimensional Approach”, which was held at the Capital Hilton Hotel in Washington, D.C., on September 08–09, 2006. This conference was the product of the remarkable efforts of the entire community of TIPS. This conference could not be accomplished without the TIPS members' outstanding amount of hard work. The executive directors of the conference created a website for the participants to visit and learn more about the conference. This website can be visited at http://tipsonline.org/nato/.
These three ARWs brought together well-known key speakers and participants from top universities, research study centers, and law enforcement agencies to understand the threat of terrorism, to promote cooperation between governments and agencies, and to look at practical ways to thwart and respond to terrorism within a multi-dimensional perspective. The number of the participants in this program was over 350. Approximately 200 key speakers out of the 350 participants made their presentations in the sessions throughout the program. The participants came to the conference from 17 different countries including but not limited to the USA, Turkey, Russia, Italy, France Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, Singapore, Georgia, Macedonia, Jordan, and Ukraine. The participants debated their ideas, thoughts, information, and knowledge about how to deal with the terrorism phenomenon and how to respond to the threat of terrorism in the 43 sessions throughout the program. All the representatives of the countries, law enforcement professionals, faculty members, public and civilian organizations had a chance to explore workable actions in combating terrorism, to respond to terrorism and advance the cooperation level against it. Given the strong scholarly record on terrorism by the participants, the executive directors of the ARWs invited the participants to submit their papers for publication by IOS Press.
The papers were collected and edited by Suleyman Hancerli and Ozgur Nikbay, the editors of this book. In fact, there are four parts and 34 chapters in this book. The first part (Understanding Terrorism) has six chapters; the second part (Suicide Attacks, Radical terrorism and Case Studies) has seven chapters; while the third part (Strategies and Tactics for Dealing with Terrorist Hostage Sieges, Hijackings and Kidnappings) has ten chapters; and the fourth part of the book (Counter-Terrorism Policies: Lessons for the Future) has eleven chapters. The editors selected as the title for the book Understanding and Responding to the Terrorism Phenomenon: A Multi-Dimensional Perspective. This title encapsulates the various themes of the 34 chapters of this book which highlight how to understand the terrorism phenomenon and analyze how to respond to terrorist operations and how to promote counter-terrorism policies on the part of the governments and law enforcement professionals.
This study is the executive summary of the entire book consisting of four primary parts: (1) understanding the terrorism phenomenon; (2) suicide attacks, radical terrorism and case studies; (3) strategies and tactics for dealing with terrorist hostage sieges, hijackings, and kidnappings; and (4) counterterrorism policies and lessons for the future. The 34 chapters in the 4 parts are summarized by the authors in this study for the readers to understand every aspect of the terrorism phenomenon carefully processed throughout this book.
Domestic terrorist groups that operate within and against democracies are not composed of people who are identically motivated or psychologically similar. Democracies, by their very nature, provide effective and legitimate channels for change and dissent. Therefore, when they are faced with internal terrorist threats it is axiomatic that those who are making the threats have motives other than promoting political, social, or economic change. Research has shown that most domestic groups include at least three types of personalities, a paranoid type, and antisocial type and an inadequate. Each has its strength and weakness. Each plays a role in the groups' ability to function. To more effectively engage and eliminate a terrorist group, it behooves law enforcement to more closely examine and categorize the group membership and approach the weak link using the methods suggested in this paper.
The paper begins with developing the historical difference between the old and new forms of terrorism, emphasizing that the old, mostly left-wing terrorism was circumscribed in its violence because it was political. The new violence is right-wing and millennial, which lifts the restrictions on the violence. Then the changing form of Al-Qaeda is discussed, especially after the American attacks following 9/11, and its dispersal. That in turns leads into an analysis of the significance of the internet, including its psychological meanings, in fostering the organization, recruitment, and aspirations of jihadis everywhere. The importance of the American war in Iraq is noted as a training ground for future terrorists.
The prospect of large scale biological weapons terrorism is dreadful. Yet the empirical record of terrorists turning to disease is scant and its consequences have been modest compared to other terrorist incidents. This chapter describes the terrorist incidents that have taken place and the state biological weapons programs that have been in place in the past. It describes rapid advancements in biotechnology that could make the potential problem more severe. The author argues that secrecy in bioweapons defense as well as possibly hidden offensive programs exacerbate the problem and could lead to weapons development through misunderstandings or mistaken intelligence. She argues for greater transparency and strengthening of the international agreements that outlaw the possession and development of biological weapons.
This paper considers terrorism as a market, with a supply side that has received inordinate attention and a demand side that has received too little. The demand for terrorism is principally about fear: there would be little reason to produce terrorism if it did not bring attention to the causes of terrorists, and it brings attention primarily by way of fear. We consider here the nature and sources of the demand side of the terrorism market, starting with the truism that acts of terrorism serve the purposes of terrorists because of the public's fear. The paper then analyzes fear in terms of its relationship to actual risks, perceived risks, and internal and external stimuli that contribute to it, and it describes a model of fear management based on the Routine Activities Theory and the balancing of the social costs of fear. It considers the roles of media and politics as both stimuli and prospective tools for managing fear.
The fundamental problems of the international political order currently seem mainly to be the inability of many states to provide for the welfare and security of their citizens and the demands of global governance in an anarchic world, the horrifying economic disparities between the rich north and the impoverished south, global warming, and AIDS. In addition to these, terrorism has become the number one item on the agenda of world politics since September 11. This paper tries to analyze the case of terrorism through the view of an economic historian, its relation with religions, the causes of terrorism from both sides, from attackers and those who are subject to these attacks. The paper focuses on the importance of education to eradicate it and offers to use the ability of empathy, a natural, wonderful God-given gift man is bestowed, to understand each other and act accordingly, and finally suggests a model of man, which is termed man of society, for a peaceful world community.
Suicide bombings, a subset of general terrorism, modus operandi provide an advantage to the perpetrators. A militant who intends to detonate the explosives at a particular target is the ultimate smart bomb, aiming to kill both him/herself and destroy the target to send the terrorist's message. This paper analyzes the uncompleted suicide attacks from the original interview statements of perpetrators along with an up-dated analysis of completed suicide attacks committed in Turkey between 1996 and 2005. This research answers questions about suicide bombings in areas where police and researchers have very limited information: What are the known characteristics of suicide bombers across time in Turkey? What additional characteristics exist for unsuccessful suicide bombers?
This paper examines the phenomenon of Palestinian Istishhadia, the term used by Palestinians to describe suicide bombings, and is based on personal interviews with imprisoned Palestinian surviving suicide bombers and their dispatchers from various organizations between 1993 and 2006. This neither linear nor static phenomenon is divisible into two main periods. The first period spans from April 1993 to March 2000 and the second from October 2000 to June 2006. In addition to examining the principal methods of both periods, this paper analyzes organizational distinctions in the planning and management of suicide bombings as well as the motives that led individuals and organizations to choose these methods. In spite of the fact that many in the Palestinian leadership realized that the suicide weapon was a double-edged sword, suicide operations are still being launched. However, their numbers have lessened greatly due to Israel's effective counter terrorism policy and Palestinian indigenous political considerations.
In recent years, the concept of “Radical Islam” in post-Soviet states has been articulated quite frequently. This paper provides a brief historical overview of Islam in post-Soviet states, and examines whether the claims that radical Islam in post-Soviet states is growing and poses a threat to regional and global security are justified. The paper also examines the two Islamic movements that have had the greatest impact especially in Central Asia in recent years: the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (the IMU) and Hizb ut-Tahrir. Finally, the paper seeks answers to the following question: What should be done to eliminate at best, or reduce at least, the influence of radical Islamic movements in post-Soviet states? The author concludes that the threat of radical Islamic movements in post-Soviet states is neither a fiction to ignore, nor a reality to fear. He opines that the existing, but exaggerated threat of radical Islamic movements is used to justify aggressive measures by the governments of post-Soviet countries, particularly Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Federation. Finally, the author suggests several recommendations to external actors and the governments of post-Soviet states, particularly the government of the Russian Federation which still has the greatest impact on the region's politics, to skillfully absorb the negative influences of the relatively slowly rising trend, radical Islam; and to utilize the high values of Islam against the terrorists and separatists in the region.
This paper will explore how and why the anti-systemic movements in Turkey, such as the radical Islamists and the Kurdish separatists, that arose approximately in the same period of time and geographic region, almost simultaneously started to moderate their demands, gave up their utopian ethnic or religious ideals and showed interest in a pluralist solution from within the preexisting political and geographic boundaries1. I suggest that what define Turkish politics are the relations of power between the urban ruling elite and the isolated and agitated agrarian periphery. I find that in either movement, the “peripheral” identity was more critical than religion or ethnicity. Therefore, the changes in the center-periphery relations that took place in the late 1990s marked the beginning of a new era in Turkish politics. The decentralization of the state and its approximation to the EU created new opportunities for the periphery to enhance its condition from within the legal framework. These developments led to the moderation of previously anti-systemic Islamic and Kurdish movements, a de-emphasis on ethnic and religious elements in their discourse and the emergence of a new consensus around a cosmopolitan democratic approach.
The PKK has long been able to establish associations throughout Europe. What Turkish authorities want from their European allies is to close down these associations and cut off the PKK's organizations across Europe and financial support that come through these associations. Yet, European countries are reluctant to take such measures. The schism between Turkey and European countries regarding taking effective measures against the PKK is an outcome of different paradigms. European countries and Turkey, have two different opinions on international relations. In their foreign affairs, most European countries, especially the north-western ones, see the world from the perspective of interdependency theories. However, Turkish authorities, on the other hand, see the world as an “anarchy,” from the viewpoint of the realist perspective. Therefore, conflicts occur due to the different perspectives of understanding the issue of the PKK.
The non-state actors of security studies such as transnational organized crime and terrorism are more complicated and challenging in terms of empirical support. The comparative decrease in state sponsorship of terrorism after the end of cold war led the scholars, law enforcement agencies and intelligence organizations to investigate the financial resources of global terrorism. The nexus between terrorists and organized crime groups is based on ad hoc interdependence rather than alleged continual convergence. However, terrorist organizations are more involved into organized crime activities without cooperating with the transnational organized crime groups. This paper examines the evolution of PKK-KONGRA GEL's involvement into illicit drug business from taxing the traffickers to distribution of heroin over the Western European street markets.
This study attempts to explore potential spatial association among PKK-KONGRA GEL (People's Congress of Kurdistan) terror incidents rates across the cities in Turkey from 2003 to 2004. To fill the possible deficiencies for traditional statistical analyses across the geography, the current research addresses the significant role of spatial dependency before finalizing any statistical model associated with the geography. It, therefore, realizes positive spatial autocorrelation by utilizing Moran's I and LISA statistics. Accordingly, it contends that any results with these models might more reliably direct the essential policy considerations about terrorism after understanding and coping with the possible spatial dependency in the incident distribution.
Hostage holding has been utilized as an instrument of politics and commerce since the beginning of recorded history. For those events that took place in public view a familiar official response was to meet force with force. Social unrest in various parts of the world during the 1960s and 1970s sometimes resulted in an assortment of domestic and international terrorist events. Time and again, hostages were held. Although official response was often predicated on a swift resolution through the application of necessary force, authorities were frequently thrust into the reluctant role of negotiator. Police Hostage Negotiation (HN) in the US began as an innovative NYPD practice more than 30 years ago largely as a result of the 1972 terrorist attack at the Munich Olympics. The vast majority of incidents were concluded without loss of life. Included in these numbers are responses to airplane hijacking events in conjunction with the Police Department of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and with the FBI. In the ensuing years HN practices were adapted and adopted by the majority of US police agencies. The 9-11 attacks prompted some to question the future value of HN as a police tactic. This essay discusses the issues and suggests that HN should continue as a tool in the arsenal for responding to hostage holding events.
The ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) data set compiled by Mickolus et al., indicates that governments basically respond to terrorist hostage incidents in three ways: negotiation, shootout, and other responses such as massive nationwide searches for terrorists, especially when kidnapping occurs. This empirical study by using logit models, tries to estimate the probability of hostages being killed because of these response options. It focuses on characteristics of negotiators and tries to estimate the probability of hostages being killed when the number of negotiators increases, controlling for: the duration and the size of the incident, the number of governments and entities involved, terrorists' demands and behaviors, and the effect of having non-governmental targets when ransom is demanded by terrorists. It offers policy implications regarding how to handle hostage-taking terrorism incidents and the appropriate number of negotiators in a negotiation process.
In the last four decades, hostage situations have rapidly increased in the world due to the threat of terrorism and other social problems. The goals of hostage takers are to achieve certain political, criminal, or social benefits through hostage situations. Hostage incidents are common types of situations that police are forced to confront in the societies. Police apply either negotiation or tactical team intervention in hostage situations to recover hostages. In the past, the police most commonly used the tactical operations to end situations often resulting in the loss of lives of hostages, but in the last few decades there has been a change in favor of negotiation. The real success in this endeavor is based on effective communication strategies. The purposes of this study are to analyze the historical background of hostage situations, to identify effective negotiation strategies in a case study approach, and to provide some future recommendations for governments, police agencies, and researchers for peaceful resolutions in hostage situations.
Governments today must be prepared to face a wide range of possible terrorist acts. Among the likely acts of terrorism is the terrorist hostage siege incident. Experience shows that governments are not sufficiently prepared for this type of event. Many countries have trained tactical teams ready to confront terrorists with force, but these same countries do not typically have qualified negotiation teams that are able to peacefully resolve such incidents. This lack of capability greatly limits the ability of these countries to effectively manage and peacefully resolve terrorist hostage sieges. In addition, political decision makers often do not understand what their proper roles are in the effective management of such sieges. Governments require the services of trained and skilled negotiators, operating as part of a larger law enforcement response apparatus, if they wish to properly and effectively manage a terrorist hostage siege incident. In this study, the critical issues related to this need are discussed and specific future recommendations made by the researcher1 for governments and police agencies to consider. The information in this study is based on the researcher's personal work experience. The primary aim of this article, in fact, is to make contributions to police agencies' negotiation strategies.
The purpose of this essay is to argue for a systems perspective of crisis negotiation. Previous research and literature has primarily focused on parts, or subunits, of the negotiation process. For example, much of the research into crisis negotiations has addressed the interaction between negotiators and hostage taker. While such research is valuable, over-emphasis on this interaction may result in the neglecting of other key components of the negotiation process. This essay will begin by introducing systems theory and arguing that a crisis negotiation is a system. A review of case studies will be used to support this claim. The paper will conclude with practical and theoretical implications of the utilizing a systems perspective.
In today's world replete with conflict, national law enforcement agencies are often required to assist in negotiating the release of kidnapped countrymen. There is, however, little understanding of the bargaining process among law enforcement officials. This paper was written by the author in an effort to equip law enforcement negotiators with the skills necessary to function in this high stakes trade in human misery. The paper outlines a model of response that includes kidnapper motivation, types of kidnapping, kidnap dynamics, management strategies and tactics.
John Richardson, Christopher Voss, John Flood, Jeremy Jones
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Kidnapping funds organized crime and terrorism, and damages developing economies by discouraging tourism and foreign investment, straining international alliances and creating human capital flight. Governments have two unattractive choices: allow payment of ransom, and thus encourage more kidnapping, or attempt to stop families and associates from paying, which, if successful, likely sacrifice the life of the hostage. This paper argues for a more vigorous and sophisticated approach: disrupting the business model of kidnapping organizations. The FBI has developed a doctrine of crisis negotiation that has proven effective at undermining the business of kidnapping while still prioritizing the life of the hostage. It steers negotiations in ways likely to produce evidence for eventual prosecution while making negotiations costly and burdensome to kidnappers without provoking an open confrontation. Our goal is to spread the use of these techniques to allied governments and law enforcement organizations.
The crime of kidnapping has become a significant weapon of influence and source of funding for criminals and terrorists. Kidnapping is defined as the unlawful seizure and detention of a person usually for a ransom. Criminals view kidnapping as an effective way to get money. Terrorists may claim a political objective for taking hostages, but their ultimate goal in most instances is to obtain money. Companies that are international in scope are particularly vulnerable to having an employee kidnapped. It is a necessity to have a Kidnap Response Plan in place to provide a structured approach to successfully manage the crisis. Companies responding to international kidnappings will most likely be faced with the challenge of dealing with multiple governments and successfully interacting with law enforcement agencies, victim families and the media. The welfare of an employee may very well depend on the ability to navigate the internal and external complexities of the crisis. The primary aim of this article is to make contributions to police agencies' negotiation strategies. The information and knowledge in this study is based on the researcher's1 personal work experience.
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