Ebook: Science and Society in the Face of the New Security Threats

The workshop came about as a result of my involvement as a researcher at Cambridge University where I met Chris Donnelly, Senior Fellow at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, a man of great vision, humility and tireless energy in the encouragement of cooperation and new thinking at every level in our ever-changing world. His mentorship has been truly inspiring. He encouraged me in two areas, first to bring together various strands of my previous experience: working as an Advocate inter alia with the Commissioners for Research and Development and Information Technologies at the European Commission in Brussels; with the Cambridge-MIT Institute in Cambridge and with my work at the Judge Business School in Cambridge on the Eurasia Programme of Advanced Leadership and Management for young professionals from the former Soviet Union. Second he helped me network to obtain potential partners who could contribute to and benefit from a forum of discussion about changes in the world of science and security and what was needed to help our societies both locally and globally to survive and flourish.

I made contact with my co-Director Dr. Svetlana Saveleva through a former colleague and with a small group of willing organisers, developed a programme that we thought would illustrate the challenges faced by several nations today and provide hope and inspiration though presentations of best practice and new initiatives in a number of diverse locations: UK-US, Turkey, Norway, Baltic States.

The event itself took place in the autumnal sunshine of St. John's College Cambridge. After setting the scene of the scientific and security challenges facing NATO, the Military, the Police, and society in general, we looked at the experience of several countries in particular. This was followed by the break out sessions which were tailored to allow discussion among the different groups representing the wealthier western countries, the former Soviet Union and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. This meant they could better focus on their own areas of cultural and social concern rather than have a mixture in each break out group. The facilitators chosen were experts in the issues and helped generate valuable debate.

A mix too of different sectors – public and private, civilian and military, (industry, academia, military, police, intelligence services), national and international – were chosen to promote helpful dialogue, cooperation and highlight case studies of successful inter-sector and interdisciplinary projects. Again this worked well in practice and helped develop an opportunity for a useful network of experts. Everyone had a part to play in the proceedings as a speaker, facilitator, rapporteur or chair person.

Consideration was given to providing sufficient time for informal discussion over coffee breaks, lunch, dinner where so many fruitful ideas can be forthcoming. On the last evening a party atmosphere was created in an historic pub in Cambridge where each of the remaining participants had to say a poem, tell a joke or sing a song in their national tongue followed by a translation in English. Expressions of cultural diversity remind us of our common humanity with themes such as love and loss helping to nurture tolerance, understanding and a good laugh.

My thanks go to Lucie Bratinkova, Gwen Buchan, Rachel Priestman for their help as rapporteurs or general support during the event itself; to Professor Ralph Pettman (International Relations) of Victoria University of Wellington who had to cancel attendance at the eleventh hour due to illness but had been a great help in the lead up to the workshop; Eve Williamson for her patience with typing and general organisation, and to Abimbola Agboluaje who stepped in to help both during the workshop as a rapporteur and then in the post-production phase with making up the CD-Rom and helping to edit this book. My appreciation is also for Fernando Carvalho Rodrigues who gave an insightful after-dinner speech and encouraged me, like Chris Donnelly, to develop my research and new ideas further. Such endorsement from men of utter distinction is humbling, but encouraging. My thanks too for Liz Cowan from NATO, a fellow Scot, for helping me through many a bureaucratic challenge.

Mary Sharpe

A study of history shows us that at approximately every 50 years the world experiences a revolutionary change in the nature of armed conflict provoked by sociological, technological or other external factors (Donnelly 2004). In the past two centuries there was the development of mass conscript armies during the Napoleonic wars, rapid-firing rifled weapons in the mid-19^th century, industrialisation of military production before WWI, and nuclear weaponry and their delivery during WWII. Donnelly is of the view that we are in the middle of such a change ushered in by the events of 11 September 2001, the new global power balance after the welcome collapse of the Cold War and bipolar security, the advances in technology, and growing gap between rich and poor nations and the information revolution. As a result we have moved from a Cold War to a Hot Peace with a new threat to global security through the asymmetric conflict particularly in the ‘arc of instability’ stretching from North Africa to Central Asia. The North Atlantic Alliance (NAA) founded originally by 12 nations after the Second World War was preoccupied for some 40 years with the Cold War and the threat posed by the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, NATO reinvented itself by focussing on Partnership with the nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States. It has now expanded to 26 member states and 46 Partner nations and faces a new challenge of defining its role in the 21^st century. It currently sees itself as ensuring the joint security through political and military cooperation and collective defence of its member states. In this paper I wish to argue that such a view needs to be transformed. First, ‘security’ means much more than just military might; it includes non-military threats such as incompetent governance, corruption, organised crime, insecure borders, smuggling, illegal migration, ethnic and religious conflict, proliferation of WMDs, shortage of natural resources and of course terrorism. Second, a unique opportunity exists to contribute to world peace through the leadership role that can be exerted by the Ambassadors of NATO in Brussels. The background to my argument emerges from a scientific rather than a purely military perspective based on my experience as UK Representative on the NATO Science Committee.

The new challenges that international terrorism presents to security constitute the latest of the revolutions in the nature of armed conflict that the world experiences approximately every fifty years. Like the ones before it, the current revolution has been driven by a multiplicity of factors. It is mainly characterised by the proliferation of technology, the growing gap between rich and poor countries and the information revolution. The nature of the new threats calls for responses that are non-military. The nature of military forces also has to change to combat these threats. The implications of these changes for NATO and the EU are analysed. Various actors need to form a ‘security community’ in order to effectively combat these threats.

I will first identify what I consider to be the key aspects of the New Security Environment – from the military point of view – those which will impact most on the reality of combat operations. And then I shall consider their implications for each of the Components of Fighting Power – The Physical, Conceptual and Moral. The nature of the new threats to security and the breadth of the responses to them together with the rapid progress of information technologies combine to present an array of personal, social and organisational challenges to soldiers, armies and nations.

The reality of terrorist attacks on civilian targets coincides with the rise in the level of accountability required for use of the public resources devoted to security. Allocating resources to combat the usual crimes and potential terrorist attacks is a big challenge for the Metropolitan Police. Other big challenges are how to balance the need for security with the normal freedoms expected in a parliamentary democracy and how to react to potential terrorist attacks in a manner that is commensurate with the level of the threat and that reassures rather than “terrorises” citizens and excessively disrupts the normal functioning of society. The work of other important actors in the society, such as the media, is important to achieving the right balance.

This article explores what the response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 teaches us about Western society today. There has been a wealth of research examining the purported cultural background and psychology of the perpetrators of those events (1). That focus has two main rationales; to identify and deal with potential terrorists, and to begin to tackle what are considered to be the 'root causes' of terrorism – usually held to stem from poverty and disaffection across the Third World (2). These approaches offer a somewhat predictable and reassuring explanation of events. They locate the problem of terrorism elsewhere – in the minds, actions and cultures of others. At best, those posing a threat are understood to be reacting in an adverse way to what are held to have been the injustices committed against their forebears during an earlier age of imperial domination. Here, I wish to consider the extent to which some of the issues may be far closer to home, and more contemporary, than we like to envisage. In part, this is due to the particular way in which Western societies perceive and deal with anything that involves risk nowadays (3). If anything, the actual threats posed could be conceived of as weaker today than those presented throughout most of the Cold War, yet society appears to react as if they were stronger. Why is this? And what does this tell us about ourselves? A focus on our increasingly exaggerated perceptions of risk and the adverse consequences this brings, both to the people of the Third World and for Western societies, is a missing element to our analysis of terrorism that we ignore at our peril. Ultimately, if our responses are shaped, in part at least, through the prism of our own domestic fears and insecurities, then the actions taken will prove limited or ineffective, and may serve to confuse matters more. A mystifying mythology is created, which in its turn demands totemic gestures to reassure the public. This process, readily becomes a self-fulfilling fantasy which – far from assuaging our concerns – will only drive them further.

In recent years turbulent regional and global developments and crises have presented the international community with major military, political and economic challenges. This brief overview will present the key security and geopolitical issues in the Caspian region – especially southern Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus – which is increasingly becoming a significant area in world affairs, not only for its proximity to the wider Middle East, but especially for its geo-strategic value and energy resources.

For instance, a high oil price around the globe has enabled Russia to accumulate over $16.7 billion in its energy-stabilisation fund. Asia Times, 27 January 2005.

After the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, Estonia has been preoccupied with both the challenges of protecting its security and modernizing its economy. While the threats to its security are only potential and could be managed through membership of international security alliances, Estonia would have to take on the urgent tasks of making its economy modern and competitive largely by itself. The country is confronting these tasks mainly through a robust Research and Development (R&D) drive in science and technology. Successful innovations in these areas that can be applied to fighting the new security threats within societies can allow countries like Estonia to make a far greater contribution to global security relative to their size or national defence budgets. In this paper, I will review Estonia's R&D strategy, its implementation and the lessons learnt.

The paper first examines the post-Soviet challenges of the Lithuanian armed forces and security. The major change in the country's security arrangements has been the cooperation with NATO and the eventual gaining of NATO membership. This process has familiarised Lithuania with cooperation in the area of international security. With the rise of new security threats which need to be countered with innovative applications from the world of scientific research, the contribution of Lithuania to international security can be broadened. This paper surveys the science and technology research assets of Lithuania and their potential contribution to fighting new security threats.

Hungary's potential to contribute to international security through science and technology research faces a number of daunting obstacles. As elsewhere in the transition countries of Europe, there is a squeeze on budgets for both defence and science and technology research. But the major challenges are attitudinal; politicians and the science establishment have to overcome the legacy of the Soviet era. Political elites need to take a more active interest in defence issues and academics, especially social scientists, need to develop a research agenda that escapes the ideological constraints of the past.

Over the last 15 years, the international security situation has changed dramatically. The possibility of a global and possibly nuclear war – that was very unlikely even in the era of the Cold War – now seems almost unthinkable. At the same time, however, new security threats are facing a modern and globalised society. The lines between “outside” and “inside” the state are being continually redrawn in the process, and in many cases, they are being completely erased. This paper will highlight some important research topics that should be of importance in order to support efforts to respond to the changed security environment.

The author volunteered to give a presentation at the workshop on a relatively short notice when Björn Sundelius had to withdraw his paper with the title “The Scandinavian Model”. This paper is based on security related research in Norway, in particular at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment.

Since the events of 9/11/2001, security concerns have become of notably greater importance in policy agendas. In December 2003, the European Union (EU) defined its first security strategy (A Secure Europe in a Better World adopted by EU heads of State and Governments). This marked an important step towards a convergence of views on security within the EU and also provided the basis for the development of a new European security culture. In 2004, the European Commission launched a Preparatory Action in the field of security research entitled ‘Enhancement of the European industrial potential in the field of security research’ with a view to improving the security of European citizens, reinforcing European technological and industrial potential in security-related areas, and establishing a comprehensive European Security Research Programme from 2007 onwards.

Effective security policies depend critically on assessing what scientific and technological knowledge is available, what knowledge is needed and how that knowledge can be put into effective use. The challenge is to understand how science and technology can contribute towards tackling threats and security challenges.

This paper provides an overview of the recent developments in the EU's approach to security research.

We describe the mission, strategic goals, processes, programmes and initial outcomes of a joint $100M project between Cambridge University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The central focus is knowledge exchange between and within organisations, and particularly between universities and industry. Our work is carried out with three thrusts, education for innovation, knowledge integration around research and new forms of university engagement with industry.

This paper takes a look at the spectre of terrorism in the Islamic societies of the Middle East through the experience of a model of social engineering on which the Science Park of the Istanbul Technical University (“ARI Teknokent”) is being designed, the Agora. The Agora concept refers to a zone or process of experimentation that successfully “incubates” positive values and then diffuses them to the institutions of the larger society. The Science Park brings together capitalists and academics for the purpose of creating a dynamic mechanism of spreading knowledge and technology. While foreign capital and knowledge are sought-after, care is taken to ensure that the project is rooted locally. Such Agoras offer a model for combating terrorism. They can be used to diffuse knowledge and economic progress, thus depriving the terrorist of recruits.

The thrust of the Royal Society's work on security in the United Kingdom is concerned with how to make the UK “safer”. Though the work is concerned only with the UK, its findings and recommendations are relevant to other countries and regions. Two of them are of particular importance. Many government agencies are involved with security-relevant work; there is a need for coordination if duplication is to be prevented. Coordination will enhance the capacity of the UK to respond effectively to attacks. The coordination must involve the private sector that has diverse skills and technologies that could be critical in combating the new security threats.

As the fight against terrorism takes central stage in a new paradigm of conflict, there needs to be a careful re-assessment of how an effective division of effort between universities, national laboratories, defence, commercial industry and the military can be developed to deal with critical new challenges. What, for instance, are the real incentives for government, the science and technology community and private industry to co-operate, more than these different actors have in the past? How can these incentives be harmonised with dramatically differing strategic objectives for each of them? How can any disincentives be overcome when there is a change in strategy?